THE BATTLES OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT Designer's Notes by Mark Herman Introduction The Macedonian war machine was arguably the premier army of antiquity. It was c reated by Philip II and wielded by his son with such effect that it never lost a battle or a siege. What was the secret of its power? This question has intrig ued me since my youth and this game was the opportunity to figure it out. It is interesting to note that the seeds of the Macedonian military doctrine can pro bably be traced to Epaminondas the Theban who defeated the Spartan army at Leuc tra and Mantinea. It seems that Philip II while a youth was a quest (hostage) i n Thebes and knew the great man. It was from the knowledge gained as a youth th at Philip built the instrument which Alexander would use to conquer the Persian empire. Hoplite Warfare Greek warfare had become formalized into a clash of heavy hoplite infantry on a n open plain, usually the prime farmland of one of the antagonists. The battle would be decided in a mighty rush (Ephodos) of the opposing battlelines with vi ctory going to the stouter of heart. Generalship is what occurred prior to the Hoplite battle. A General's main responsibility was to get his army to the batt le, line them up, and lead them forward. The concept of reserves had not yet be come an accepted part of Hoplite warfare. Therefore, once the forces were lined up the General's place was at the head of his troops. Retirement on half pay w as not a normal occurrence for a Greek general. Most of whom, like Epaminondas, died in battle. Light troops and cavalry were, with few exceptions, not well developed in Greek warfare. This was a function of economics and terrain. Effective light troops require training. Training costs money and a standing force was hard for the ty pical Greek city state to maintain. Cavalry suffered for many of the same reaso ns besides the fact that the dominant terrain (mountains) and lack of modern li very (saddle, horseshoes, stirrups) prevented mounted forces from becoming an e ffective combat arm in Hoplite battles. For the most part these auxiliary forces sniped at each other on the sidelines while the main Hoplite clash decided the battle. There were important exception s to this rule. Thessaly and Macedon possessed areas of open terrain which allo wed for the development of competent cavalry forces. The famous Macedonian Comp anion cavalry units rose from these humble beginnings. During the Peloponnesian War, at the battle of Delium, the unexpected arrival of a small Theban cavalry unit on the flank of the Athenian battleline caused a panic that was decisive. Meanwhile, in Thrace and Aetolia where the terrain was heavily forested, capab le light troops developed whose missile volleys could defeat Hoplites in closed terrain. Although there are many more exceptions, auxiliary forces tended to c ancel each other out when neither side had a significant numerical advantage in cavalry or light troops. In summation the Greek combat system developed around shock combat almost to th e exclusion of all other combat arms. It survived for as long as it did due to the unique nature of the terrain and the polis (city state) from which it arose . One of the continuing problems of Greek economics was its inability to suppor t a growing population on poor farmland. This lead to significant migrations of colonists around the periphery of the Aegean sea and much of the Mediterranean . These migrations brought Greek culture in contact with the Persians. Marathon: A Clash of Systems The Persian combat system emphasized missile combat almost to the exclusion of all other arms. The Persian army was formed around foot archers and mounted jav elin armed cavalry with the odd chariot available on occasion. The Persian succ esses in battle were more a function of the incompetence of their early opponen ts than the brilliance of their combat system. Athenian meddling in Asia Minor eventually angered the Persians, who sent out a punitive expedition to punish t he upstarts. The resulting battle of Marathon highlighted the Persian inability to deal with a shock oriented combat system. By all rights the missile volleys of the Persian archers should have defeated the Greek Hoplites. But, the Athen ian charge covered the effective bow range too quickly for the Persians to loos e many volleys, and the Hoplite panoply was resistant enough to arrows to keep the battleline cohesive. Once the forces were in contact the narrow beach did n ot allow for the typical Persian tactic of rapid withdrawal and the resulting s laughter ended the raid. The Persians never quite figured out how to deal with these vicious Westerners who insisted on fighting toe to toe. Eastern culture was familiar with the concept of mercenaries and ultimately settled on hiring Hopli te units to augment their missile armed forces. These hiring practices were not augmented by a significant change in doctrine so the Persian forces still did not act as a combined arms force. Chaeronea: A Clash of Systems Over a century later, Philip II leaves Thebes and creates a new system of warfa re. His concept is for a fully coordinated and balanced force which combines th e best features of missile, shock, and maneuver tactics. Most perceptions of th e Macedonian army revolve around the Phalanx and the Companion cavalry, both of which are shock combat systems. In fact the Macedonians matched their opponent s missile for missile while employing all arms as complementary parts of a sing le lethal whole. Philip unleashed his forces on the Hoplite system at Chaeronea and carried the day. The significant factor besides the brilliant doctrine and lead ership was the fact that the Macedonians were professionals. Philip, who was th e architect of Alexander's rise to greatness, had early in his career gained co ntrol of significant gold deposits in Thrace which he used to raise a professio nal army. The Macedonian System The purpose of the historical commentary was to highlight a critical design con cept; the interaction of differing tactical systems. Most wargames treat all co mbat units as a singular entity while only varying speed and strength to show u nit distinctions. I believe this approach is fundamentally wrong and removes mo st of what is important about tactical interactions in combat. While it is true that in most of Alexander's battles he was never as outnumbered as his officia l press proclaimed, the success of his army was based on its intricate interpla y of differing tactical systems. The base and backbone of the Macedonian army during its conquest of the Persian empire was its 12,000 Phalangites organized into 6 Phalanxes. These phalanxes were the base upon which the wings maneuvered. A key misperception concerning P halanxes is that they were superior Hoplites. This is incorrect. Whereas in a H oplite battle the clash of the battlelines was the decisive moment, in the Mace donian system the Phalanx did not close until after the wings had been engaged. The power of the Phalanx was based on its defensive dominance over cavalry due to the good sense possessed by horses and its offensive dominance over Hoplite s due to its superior reach. It was vulnerable to missile volleys due to its re duced armor and flank attacks due to the disadvantages of a pike in close comba t. It is interesting to note that the famous Swiss pikemen would overcome this latter vulnerability by employing Halberdiers within their formation for close combat situations. Although it is true that no Phalanx ever broke in battle it was found in some p laytests that they were more fragile than expected. A close examination of the playtests and history revealed the cause. Wargames force the static narratives of history to become dynamic systems. What can occur is often startling since t he wargame can read between the lines and reveal what was too obvious for the a ncient author to write about. It also served as an example of the tactical inte rplay within the Macedonian army. No phalanx was ever engaged for more than 2 hours in a battle and usually less than 1 hour. The Phalanxes were brought into play later in a battle after the e nemy skirmishers had been run off or suppressed and the enemy wings were engage d. This allowed a Phalanx to move forward without being subjected to missile vo lleys and flank attack. Alexander employed very capable skirmishers (Agrianian and Thracian Javelinmen, Cretan and Macedonian Archers, and Peltasts). These sk irmishers neutralized the enemy skirmishers but like all skirmishers were vulne rable to cavalry. The playtesters violated these concepts and the resulting los s of cohesion due to missile volleys and overuse of the rapid advance capabilit ies burned out the Phalanx prior to its shock combat. In these circumstances, f resh Greek Hoplite units were often able to outlast the Phalanx with disastrous effect. Once the correct tactics were employed and a rules change prevented Persian archers from committing suicide all worked as was intended. The offensive power of the Macedonian army was their shock cavalry: the Compani ons. This arm was usually on the right flank and often lead by Alexander person ally. The cavalry would often be directly supported by missile troops for fire support and light cavalry for flank protection in a crushing oblige attack. Ale xander's Companions were armored and possessed a lance which outreached their o pponents javelins. Darius at Arbela (Gau Gamela) attempts to neutralize this we apon by arming his heavy cavalry in a similar manner. The Companions were super bly trained and could carry a charge home. Since the stirrup had not yet been i nvented, the rider thrust with his lance at his enemy, as opposed to the mediev al knight who bore the brunt of the lances impact. The history of Alexanders ba ttles shows that the Companion cavalry had no equals in combat. Now once the Companion cavalry had moved out to engage the enemy the right flan k of the Phalanxes should become uncovered except for the presence of the Hypas pists. The role of the Hypaspists (shieldbearer) was to maintain the linear con nection between Alexanders advancing right wing and the right flank of the Phal anx. Since this force was designed to spread out, it was organized into smaller tactical units than a Phalanx. The exact armaments of a Hypaspist are unknown but they appear to be Hoplite armed heavy infantry with lighter body armor for increased mobility. Now while the right wing advanced off of its Phalanx base the left wing had a d ifferent function. The Thessalian cavalry who were highly trained and lance arm ed were primarily defensive in character. Their main function was to ward off e nemy flank attacks and guard the left flank of the Phalanx. They would have mis sile troops in support and were lead by Parmenion, a brilliant tactician and on e of Philip's closest friends. The left wing's role was to tie up the opposing enemy wing to prevent it from harming the Phalanx or reinforcing the other wing . When all of the above was brought into play on the battlefield under the contro l of a military genius, it quickly becomes clear why the size of the respective armies was unimportant in the battle outcomes. Darius was a better general tha n his two losses would indicate, although he did lack conviction. At Issus it w as a tactical error that threw away a battlefield whose characteristics could h ave neutralized much of the Macedonian maneuver capability. At Arbela (Gau Game la) Darius picked an open battlefield with an army whose size and composition b egan to neutralize some of the Macedonian tactical advantages. In both cases it was Alexander's ability to adapt his army to the circumstances of the moment t hat ensured his place in history. The Game Design: Leadership My analysis of the Macedonian army, which I have summarized in this narrative, made me focus on two critical elements: combined arms tactics and leadership. U p to this point I have emphasized the different tactical systems in use during the period and have spoken little about Generalship. Much of my recent work has been in the area of modern Command Control and its impact on combat. A key dyn amic of leadership is its asymmetrical impact on the maneuver of forces. The us ual sequence of one player moving then the other misses the interplay of maneuv er on both the ancient and modern battlefield. Leadership became the mechanism through which the players interacted on the battlefield. Leaders are rated for their initiative and their command range. Once a leader begins giving orders, t he quantity of which is a function of his initiative, he sets forces in motion. Alexander has the highest initiative and can move the largest force in one ord ers phase. Another factor that I wanted to capture was the ability of good leaders to exce ed the expected performance of an average leader. This was captured in three wa ys. First, a good leader can move more of his forces farther than an average le ader. This was captured by having Momentum. Momentum allows a leader to have up to two additional orders phases. Since this is based on the leader's initiativ e rating, Alexander often has three orders phases to a poor leaders one per gam e turn. Second, I wanted to capture the ability of a good leader to seize the moment. T his was captured with the Trumping option. When a poor leader gets a second ord ers phase it creates an opportunity for the opposing player to interrupt the en emy player with an immediate counter move. The danger is that a failed trump ca ncels a leaders abilities for the remainder of the turn. This factor in the gam e system has the additional impact that poor leaders usually do not attempt Mom entum opportunities to avoid potential enemy counterplays. Third, leaders can move units outside of their basic movement parameters. I hav e always liked having an element of gamble within a game system, much as those faced by Alexander himself. There must however be a downside. Otherwise, where 's the gamble? A player can move a combat unit a second time during the same g ame turn but the units formation becomes less cohesive. Early playtests saw the players abuse this option because of the perception that one cohesion hit was not a big deal. The reality is that it is hard to find the opportunities for co hesion removal and units tend to build up cohesion and become fragile when call ed upon for shock combat. The intention and the proper use of this capability i s at critical moments to decisively maneuver a unit into the flank of an oppone nt. It should be noted that maneuvering a leader into a shock combat situation removes his ability to issue orders until the shock combat is conclud ed. This simulates the disadvantages of the traditional role expected of leader s in combat. Let's face it, its hard to give orders while you are fighting for your life. Leadership of the traditional type ends with Alexander. The new Mace donian combined arms system had increased the requirements for battlefield deci sion making to the point that the overall commander could no longer lead from t he front. Using Alexander in his traditional role will have great impact on wha tever shock combat he participates in, but you temporarily lose his ability to control the battle. Players tend to use Alexander for his leadership abilities and avoid his shock combat advantages. I did not want to foist an Alexander ela n rule on the players but give them the option on how to employ the greatest ge neral in antiquity. The Game Design: Combined Arms Tactics The heart of the tactical interplay is captured in the shock combat system. The key elements of shock combat are Troop Quality and Shock Superiority. Troop qu ality is a measure of how many cohesion hits a unit may receive before it routs . The higher the troop quality rating the more sustainable the unit. In the act ual battles, good units could usually engage in no more than two shock combats with a short breather in between. A unit gains cohesion hits when it moves beyo nd its normal rate, enters broken terrain (rivers and woods), receives missile volleys, and engages in shock combat. Cohesion hits can be removed with an orde r but only if the unit is out of harms way, which is often inconvenient during the heat of battle. Shock Superiority determines which tactical systems are superior when they oppo se each other in shock combat. The impact of a unit being attacked by a unit ty pe which is superior to it doubles the cohesion hits received in shock combat. Unless a unit is of unusually high quality this impact will usually decide the encounter. Another critical application of this concept is that all units are s uperior to the unit which they are delivering a flank or rear attack. Moving pa rts of an army aggressively will open flanks which an opponent probably will ex ploit. The entire Macedonian war machine was designed to prevent an enemy from exploiting vulnerabilities or open flanks. Failure to employ these tactics is d one at the players risk. Shock combat is handled in an elaborate fashion to show the dynamics of ancient shock combat and the interplay between different unit types within the same ta ctical system. Phalanxes and Hoplites are both heavy infantry and therefore nei ther is attack superior to the other, but the Phalanx has other advantages whic h the Clash of Spears Chart captures. An individual Shock combat is usually dec ided in one game turn but can last over a period of several game turns to refle ct the push and shove characteristic of ancient combat. The result of shock com bat is one or the other side routing. The Game Design: Army Rout The objective for each side is to have the opponents army rout from the field. As units rout they make a dash for safety. A leader may attempt to rally his ro uting units, but only once. A failed rally attempt results in the elimination o f the unit. This is simulating the fact that a routing unit in antiquity would throw away its weapons and armor to speed up its withdrawal. The old adage of r eturning with your shield or upon it reflected the knowledge that the first thi ng a fleeing man discards is his heavy shield, hence the loss of one's shield w as a sign of cowardice. If the leader fails in a rally attempt the assumption i s made that thereafter the unit is unarmed and therefore useless for further co mbat. Once an army has taken losses equal to its rout level the game is over. I passed on the opportunity to have an elaborate army withdrawal procedure since once an army routed in antiquity the battle was over. Why should the player w aste time with no payback? Conclusion The game system was designed to put the player in Alexander's sandals. Besides being enjoyable to play it is hoped that some of the critical aspects of ancien t warfare will be experienced and learned. It has been heartening to discover t hat the game system is flexible enough to be easily modified to reflect the his torical evolution of ancient warfare. By adding two rules: Pre-shock missile fi re and the ability to give group commands we have been able to capture the crit ical aspects of the Roman tactical system which will be released in an upcoming S.P.Q.R. game. An additional insight was that by placing a missile volley rule into the game system we were able to capture the arrow storm of Agincourt. The rule has been removed for future use since it turned a poor General like Dariu s into an effective leader. I hope you enjoy playing this game as much as I enj oyed designing it. Good hunting.