La Grande Armee / Rob Gibson

Campaign by semaphore 1809 - Napoleon's strategic blunder

Napoleon remarked in 1805 "...a man has his day in war, as in other
things - I myself shall be good for another six years". In 1809 his time
was running out fast. At the outset of the Austrian campaign of that
year, he first made an error which he was to repeat on a grand scale in
Spain and Portugal for the next four years - he attempted to direct an
Army by remote control, using semaphore stations and mounted couriers to
transmit his orders over hundreds of miles.

Many writers, past and present, have accepted Napoleon's condemnation of
Berthier's dispositions in the face of the Austrian advance, as
justified a mere staff officer overreaching himself. Berthier was more
than a mere staff officer, he was also a capable fighting general and
the organiser of Napoleon's lightning campaign in Italy in 1800 which
ended at Marengo. Major S.J. Watson in his biography of Berthier shows
evidence that these dispositions were as a result of orders given him by
Napoleon himself.

The first order, dated 28th March 1809 (Plan 'A') placed the corps of
Davout, Bessieres and Vandamme on the right bank of the Danube near
Donauworth, and the corps of Massena, Lefebre and Oudinot, around
Augsburg.

The second, dated 30th March 1809 ordered a forward concentration of the
whole army around Ratisbon. This was to be acted on in the case of the
Austrians remaining inactive after 15th April (thus Plan 'B') and was
not implemented.

The Austrians slowly advanced across the river Inn on the 10th of April,
and Berthier implemented Plan'A'. On the same day, Napoleon despatched
further instructions to Berthier, which arrived on the 12th. Massena
Lefebre and Oudinot should assemble at Augsburg, but Davout, Bessieres
and Vandamme would be disposed at a days march around Ratisbon "in spite
of anything that may happen". This order split the army into two groups
five days march apart, which would have been disastrous had the
Austrians moved faster. Berthier executed this order despite complaints
from Davout - it is preserved in the French Army archives, but is
conspicuously absent from Napoleon's correspondence .

On the 12th April at 8pm Napoleon heard of the Austrian declaration of
war (despite the fact that the Grande Armee in Bavaria was well aware of
the advance of the Austrian Army, news took so long to travel it is
doubtful if he could have known earlier). Accordingly, a further order
was despatched to Berthier, telling him to revert to Plan'A' after all.
It reached Berthier on the 16th of April. Mercifully, the Austrians were
slow in advancing; when Napoleon arrived on the 17th they had still not
made contact - the golden opportunity was gone.

To simulate the effect of the initial French confusion in the 1809
scenario of 'La Grande Armee' a new initial set up is needed for the
Allies (French) (the Austrians remain unchanged) as follows:
Nuremburg: Davout, five 2-5, two 0-4 units within 3 hexes.
Ratisbon: Bessieres, one 1-8 unit.
Munich: Lefebre, two 2-5 units.
Landshut: One 2-5 unit.
Straubing*: One 2-5 unit.
Ulm: Massena, three 2-5, one 1-8, one 0-4 unit within 2 hexes.
Augsburg: Oudinot, one 2-5, one 1-8, one 0-4 unit.
Stuttgart: Vandamme, one 2-5 unit.
Donauworth: One depot counter.
(* the actual location of Straubing is 1 hex north west of the location
shown on the game map.)

In playtesting using the revised deployment and a more energetic
Austrian commander, the French had a hard fight on their hands. This is
a good alternative to the standard 1809 Scenario; an experienced player
can take the Allied (French) side against a less experienced player as
the Austrian with a fair degree of play balance.

A future article will examine the possibilities of revolt in Germany in
the 1809 Scenario.