Date: Wed, 31 Aug 1994 13:18:16 EDT From: Cassady Craft Subject: PACIFIC WAR VARIANT THE PACIFIC WAR REVISITED (ALTERNATE START-UP SCENARIO) Victory Games' Pacific War (and the computer game of the same name by Gary Grigsby) gives the wargamer a unique opportunity to view the strategic and tactical problems that both American and Japanese military and political leaders faced from December 1941 to August 1945. While the system itself is playable (VG's and GG's), and its twenty-one scenarios (VG's) range from simple and short engagement scenarios to the mammoth strategic scenarios (which only those with abundant time and space may wish to tackle), there is one exiting scenario that was left out that a true aficionado will certainly want to try out. Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo arrived in the US in Feb. 1941 with a difficult task: to pursuade American leaders to soften their stance against Japanese implementation of a Co-Prosperity Sphere and to pressure the US government to withdraw its support from Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of the Chinese Nation- alists. Nomura achieved scarcely any progress when in July the Japanese Army moved into French Indo-China to procure air and naval bases there. This action made Nomura's difficult task even harder, as the US government first froze all Japanese assets in the US, then placed a embargo on all oil and steel shipments to Japan. As Nomura quickened to his task of negotiations, Franklin Roosevelt instructed Secretary of State Cordell Hull to stall the negotiations, partly because US policy regarded Germany as the greater threat to national security (especially because of the undeclared naval war going on between German U-boats and US convoy escorts in the Atlantic throughout 1941), and partly because of the new ORANGE war plan including the retention of the Philippines in case of war with Japan as opposed to the prevailing between war policy of consigning the Philippines to Japanese conquest after token resistance. Roosevelt and Hull planned to string the talks out until the Army could fortify the Philippines with enough men, supplies, and aircraft (especially B-17s) to hang on to these possessions until the Navy could fight its way across the Pacific to relieve them. By April 1942, MacArthur assured Roosevelt, the US could hold the Philippines. Japanese military leaders gave ther government until mid-October to negotiate a settlement with the US, as long as no real concessions were made by the Japanese (then they would decide against whom they would declare war--the US, the British Empire, Russia, or all of the above). When Roosevelt declined a proposed "Pacific Charter" meeting with Prime Minister Konoye, the military's ultimatum expired, the Konoye cabinet resigned, and a new one was drawn up by General Tojo Heideki. Now a race was on--the Japanese to muster their resourses for a move into southeast Asia and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, and the US to fly enough B-17s to the Philippines to act as a deterrent. As Japanese war planning progressed, the daring Pearl Harbor attact was only approved because Admiral Yammamoto Isorukoku, Japan's most able naval leader and commander of the Combined Fleet, threatened to resign. On 29 Nov. 41, Japan's God-Emporer Hirohito approved the military's decision for war with the US, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The rest is familiar history; the first scenario in Pacific War recreates the highly successful Pearl Harbor attack. Beyond that, in the strategic campaigns one can count on the first six months being a Japanese rampage, conquering Allied possessions at will if they only take the simple precaution of concentrating their forces. Then, as the rearmament construction authorized as part of the Second New Deal (especially the Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act) takes effect, the US turns the tide sometime between mid-42 and early-43, crushes the Japanese outer and inner defense perimeters in 1944, and threatens to invade the home islands themselves in 1945. So goes Pacific War usually--barring foolishness on the American player's part or extreme blessing of the gods on the Japanese. What would happen, however, if MacArthur and his men would have been given the five months that they ardently desired? On the afternoon of 6 Dec. 41, the President sent a cabled message to the Emperor of Japan via Ambassador Joseph Grew. Historically, Hirohito did not receive the Presiden's call for peace until after the war had begun (Japanese officials delayed it for the obvious reasons). This new scenario is built upon a slight departure from history at this point. Suppose that Hirohito received the President's message, wielded his god-like power to force the military to recall the Pearl Harbor Strike Force, and reinstituted negotiations with the US to avoid a war that he neither approved of nor could hope for Japanese victory? The major reason for this new scenario is to determine what effect the extra five months of preparation would have had on the war. For the Japanese, possible advantages are the buildup of L1 air replacements (almost impossible in the existing strategic scenarios), the delay in attrition to valuable air and naval units, ground units can be activated in China before the breakout of general warfare in the Pacific, and the Japanese can gain strategic initiative by pursuing this course and knocking the Chinese out of the war. Another advantage, both to the Japanese player and the game itself, is that this scenario inevitably alters the course of the war by making Yammamoto's Pearl Harbor raid virtually impossible to pull off, and thus really opens up the Japanese options (most US players will still lose their BBs, and often their CVs, too, against the early Japanese advantage in L2 air units), because even without the raid, there is still a great disparity in air power in the Pacific at the beginning of the war. For the Allied player, many new options open up in this scenario. If the Allied player opts to recreate US policy in late 1941 of reinforcing the Philippines (it is really hard to resist), or stations some of his capital units in the Philippines or in Singapore (as Churchill urged Roosevelt throughout 41) then this alters the strategic concepts of the war. The most difficult question for the American is, "How much strength can be forward deployed safely?" One can imagine that Roosevelt may have even sent a second "Great White Fleet" to the Far East as a deterent to the Japanese. Even if the Allied player reverts back to the original warplan and defends the Philippines with only a token force, the "Revisited" scenario will prove to make Pacific War a harder victory. With the specter of being forced to sit helplessly while the Japanese knock the Chinese armies off--remember there is no garrison requirement in case of Chinese surrender--and maybe even an attack on the Dutch without American entrance into the war, the Allied player should become uneasy at the thought of cracking the Japanese outer defense peritmeter with the added forces freed up by Chinese surrender. Here are the special rules for those game enought to take on the Pacific War and the Revisited beginning scenario: 1. Role the dice at the beginning of each operation phase. Any role of 0 on the red with <4 on the white indicates that another diplomatic breakdown has occured and the Japanese immediately declare war on all of the allies and the US. 2. The Japanese player must move all subs back to Kwajalein and Truk, and recall the Pearl Harbor Strike Force to home ports. During this movement, the Japanese can activate additional units up to thier command points allocation (to redeploy or attact the Chinese, etc.). 3. If at any time before April the Japanese attack Chinese forces, a die is rolled immediately. A roll of 0 means that the US denaounces the new Japanese aggression so strongly that war begins. The die is rolled during the "month begins" phase thereafter until April. 4. If at any point, the Japanese attack Free French forces or occupy additional French possessions in New Caledonia, New Hebrides, or Illes Horn, then roll a die; 0 to 5 results in US declaration of war. Role a die for each possession attacked. 5. If the Japanese attack any of the Dutch possessions in the East Indies (Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Ceram, Timor, or the eastern two-thirds of New Guinea), a die is rolled immediately. A 6 or less equates to the US aggressively confronting the Japanese over their expansion, with the result in a Japanese declaration of war (or surprise attack). This is rolled every "month begins" phase thereafter. 6. If the Japanese attack any British or Commonwealth forces or areas, then an 8 or less on the die, rolled every "operation begins" phase, means the war broadens to include all of the Allies. 7. If the Japanese attack the French or thier bases, another die is rolled for the British reaction. A 1 or less means that the British help their Axis conquered allies. This is a one time roll per possession attack. 8. If the Japanese attack the Dutch, 7 or less on the die in a separate roll from the US roll, equals British declaration of war. Again, roll for each possession attacked. 9. Upon British declaration of war, the US must role a die. Six or less means that the US declares war to aid the Brits. Conversely, if the US ever enters the war, the rest of the allies bet thier chips on the Americans and enter also. Victory Conditions: The victory conditions are the same as for the strategic scenarios for Pacific War, or the half-war version "The Rising Sun in the Pacific." However, the scenario really prompts the player to try to better the historical record. Replacements and Reinforcements: The Japanese receive all replacements and reinforcements as called for in the Pacific War scenario. The Australians, New Zealanders, and Chinese receive all replacements and reinforcements as usual. The US player rolls a die for each ground and naval unit due to arrive as reinforcements each month. Any unit rolling 4 or less arrives immediately in Oahu, the others are rolled for again the next month. Upon the US entrance into the war, all remaining units listed on the Jan. 42 OB become available as well as the normal reinforcements for that month (and no more die rolls!). During the next month's reinforcement stage, the Feb 42 units remaining arrive in Oahu with the usual reinforcements. This process continues until the US catches up on its OB. British ground and naval reinforcements are introduced into Colombo (naval) or Calcutta (ground) in exactly the same way as the US (roll for each unit). The Allied player may activate 50 percent of any air replacements available for each month. In determining command points, the allied player subtracts 6 from the die roll each month until war is declared. The Japanese determine their command points by totalling their Homeland Resource hex totals with their Co-Prosperity Sphere totals and dividing by two. Then consult the chart as usual. The special rule regarding strategic reserve goes like this: subtract the commands points used in Dec. 41 from 176, then put the resulting number in the future operations pool to be used by the Japanese player at his discretion. In January, Feb., March, and April repeat this procedure. When war breaks out, either in May or before, the Japanese automatically get 176 command points each month until June. Example: For Dec. 41, the Japanese has 176 available commnad points. The Japanese uses 100 command points during operations for that month. He subtracts 100 from 176 and obtains 76 points to use in his future operations pool. In January, the Japanese use 47 command points. This time he receives 129 points to be added to his future operations pool--now he has a total of 205 points for future operations. In July, the first month that the Japanese does not have the mandatory 176 command points from strategic reserve, he figures his command points thus: He has captured the Philippines, Borneo, and Singapore and thus has 36 Co-Prosperity Sphere points + 100 Homeland Resources points = 136. Divide 136 by two and you get 68. Then cross reference 68 with 649 merchant shipping points and he has 129 command points available for that month with the option of adding to this number some or all of the points left in his future operations pool. As a final note, be sure to have fun, good luck, and good hunting! Cassady Craft Department of Political Science University of Georgia e-mail CCRAFT@UGA.CC.UGA.EDU or CCRAFT@LANL.GOV