

the entry hexes on the eastern edge of the map. Entry hexes are controlled by having a unit adjacent to the hex that can extend a zone of control into the hex.

[10.13] German Decisive Victory: satisfy all three of the German Substantial Victory conditions.

[10.10] RUSSIAN VICTORY

[10.21] Russian Marginal Victory: maintain railroad communications to Leningrad from the eastern edge of the map free of enemy units.

[10.22] Russian Substantial Victory: no German units east of the Stalin Line hexrow.

[10.23] Russian Decisive Victory: no German units east of the Riga hexrow.

[10.30] NOTES ON VICTORY CONDITIONS

[10.31] Victory is determined at the end of Turn 12. Thus some of the victory objectives may be captured and recaptured in the course of play. Only the status of the victory objectives at the end of the twelfth turn counts.

[11.0] DESIGNER'S NOTES

[11.10] HISTORICAL COMMENTARY

Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 launched the greatest land campaign of all time. The Wehrmacht invaded Russia with over three million men, including allied troops. These were divided into three Army Groups: North, Center, and South. Each Army Group attacked along a different axis: North against Leningrad, Center against Moscow, and South against Kiev. Each Army Group was supported by an Air Fleet. German intelligence estimated Soviet forces at about 200 divisions, with 10,000 tanks and 4,000 aircraft. Most Russian equipment was considered obsolescent, and it was expected that these forces would be destroyed in an 8 to 10 week campaign.

Army Group North covers the campaign against Leningrad from 22 June 1941 to 12 September 1941. Army Group North was the weakest of the three Army Groups, and it faced terrain that was the least suited for mobile operations. The Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia were well roaded. The initial attack was a complete surprise, and the forces of Army Group North quickly broke through the Russian border defenses.

Panzergruppe Four, under Hoepfner, destroyed two Russian mechanized corps and crossed the Dvina at Dvinsk in a lightning five day advance. The ill-prepared Red Army fell apart under the hammer blows of the German offensive, but supply difficulties slowed the German advance. New units were mobilized and brought up to the front as the Russians regrouped. Manstein's Panzerkorps reached Luga in the middle of July, but was stopped by lack of supply and scratch Russian forces in hastily constructed fortifications built by the people of Leningrad.

In August the deadlock was broken. The Russians attacked at Stary Russa with nine divisions under 34 Army, diverting Manstein's corps from the Leningrad front. Reinhardt's panzerkorps broke through the fortifications of the Luga line near Lake Peipus, but the marshy ground impeded the advance on Leningrad. The delays imposed by logistics and terrain permitted the construction of fortifications around Leningrad and the barricading of the city. When the Panzers closed in on the city in early September, the campaign reached its most critical point. Zhukov was flown in to put new vigor into the city's defenses and time was running out for the Germans. Hitler ordered the Panzer divisions south to prepare for the final drive on Moscow.

Did Hitler's decision save Leningrad? Should the offensive have been continued? This is the controversial point of the campaign. It is essential to view this question in the context of the overall campaign. Undoubtedly the city could have been taken had Hitler decided to commit the resources. Leningrad was cut off from land communications,

and could not have been reinforced the way Stalingrad was. On the other hand, an assault against a barricaded city of three million in the teeth of naval gunfire would have destroyed several Panzer divisions. Had Hitler decided to fight in the streets of Leningrad, there would have been no Moscow campaign, and the great victory of the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement would not have been won. The cost of taking Leningrad, including opportunities foregone, must be considered before rendering a final decision.

[11.20] PLAYER'S NOTES

Army Group North pits the mobility and firepower of the German army against the space, terrain, and resource advantages of the Russians. The German player has the advantage of initial Russian weakness, but must drive nearly all the way across the map to win.

The German player must use the mobility of his mechanized units in close cooperation with the air units to destroy as many Russian units as possible early in the game. As the German units move away from the border, the seven hex supply path will slow down the advance. The German player will have to take considerable risks to keep the advance going. The German player will do well to keep his mechanized units and air operations concentrated instead of dispersed.

The Russian player has to try to retrieve as much as possible from the initial debacle. He must withdraw beyond the point where three German armies can be supplied before making a stand, and utilize terrain and entrenchments to the fullest extent when he does so. It is also important for the Russian player to keep his forces concentrated, even if it means not maintaining a continuous front. Zones of control are fluid, so surrounded units may still retreat. Building up reserve armies is also very important, giving the Russian player something with which to plug up German breakthroughs and to attack weakly held flanks.

The victory conditions are designed for both play balance and historicity. Cutting off rail communications to Leningrad was a victory for the Germans, because Leningrad was an important industrial center for the Russians. The alternative substantial victory conditions were historical options for the Germans. Tikhvin was captured by the Germans in October 1941, and recaptured by the Russians in November. Recapturing Tikhvin was essential to the Russian hopes of saving Leningrad, since it greatly shortened the distance of the Ice Road. The Germans captured Kalinin in the first stage of the Moscow offensive (Operation Typhoon) and the city was recaptured in the Russian Winter Offensive.

[11.30] ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The best general account of the war in the east (or Great Patriotic War) is Albert Seaton's *The Russo-German War, 1941-1945*. Alan Clarke's *Barbarossa* is good for understanding the intrigue between Hitler and his generals. *The 900 Days* by Harrison Salisbury gives a good account of the Russian side of the 1941 campaign and the three year siege, and is especially valuable for that reason. For the German side, *Heeresgruppe Nord* (in German) by Werner Haupt is the closest thing to an official German history of operations in the northern sector. For a more personalized view, see the relevant sections of *Manstein's Lost Victories*, and *Soldiers of Destruction*, a divisional history of the SS Totenkopf Division.

Martin van Creveld's *Supplying War* contains essential information on the logistical problems of German operations on the Eastern Front. Most commentary on Hitler's decisions is wrong because the logistical constraints on these decisions are either ignored or underestimated. Information on the Russian order of battle was derived from *War in the East*, by Simulations Publications, Inc. and from captured German documents — the intelligence