From: olletsoc@pacbell.net (Bruce Costello) Subject: Replay of Victory in Vietnam REPLAY REPORT ON: Microgame's "Victory in Vietnam". Victory in Vietnam is a campaign game on the US war in Vietnam put out by Microgame Co-Op, a frisky little Canadian DTP outfit. I am the designer of ViV. This is a replay report on a solitaire game I recently gamed. When I created ViV I wanted to provide players the possibility to exercise as many strategic options as possible, options not found in most other strategic games on the war. The Vietnam war was to most a dull horror seen on the evening news around dinner hour for endless years. In military reality, it was a dynamic conflict drawing it's essence from every facet of political and military strategy and upon which Victory would only bequeth to the side sharpest and most creative in conception and execution. The map depicts all of North and South Vietnam plus Laos, Cambodia, part of China and Thailand. The game plays in quarterly turns and runs from summer 1964 to 1975. Though most turns can be played fairly quickly, the large number of turns can become a lengthy affair. Options for negotiations and ceasefire are provided for war-weary players, as well as an optional 'sudden death' short game victory table, which can be rolled on beginning in Fall 1966. Players should be aware that the sudden death table tends to favor the NVA side...impatient US-side players are not typically rewarded in the game, as in historical actuality. The core of the game is the victory point system, a sliding scale from 1 to 99. If the scale falls below 1 at any point, the US immediately loses. If it ends the game at 99 vp in 1975 the US side wins. There are provisions for lower levels of victory. VP's are credited or debited for many things, including losses, attainment or loss of geo-political objectives, use of nuclear weapons, and a fairly long list of mostly political possibilities. In addition, there are a number of interesting political events, including off-map happenings such as a Korean crisis or World War III. The US can try and play China against the USSR, as happened in '72. It is strongly recommended that players pay some attention to the VP schedule and Political Events sheet before playing the game, as thoroughly understanding them is critical to winning. NVA strategy is somewhat constricted, as was historically the case, due to lack means. Historical communist options were simply to survive and outlast the American will to continue. The NVA player is less politically constrained than the US side though, as reflected in the VP schedule penalizing the US for executing a number of operational gambits, such as bombing airfields etc. The US side does have significant military means, but as in the real war political costs have to be taken carefully into account and strategies budgetted for. Major operations such as the invasion of Laos, Cambodia or even North Vietnam are quite feasible with intelligent advance planning. ViV, though designed primarily for ftf play, readily lends itself to solitaire gaming. ViV is not recommended for play-by-mail. The game system is simply too interactive for that to work. Hidden units might be detected, halted temporarily, and attacked by air or artillery at any time. Overruns and ambushes are the most common tactics. When new VC units enter the game, I tend to place them in such a way that I don't know their strength. I do this by drawing from an opaque cup or shaking them up in my cupped hands and placing blindly. During standard combat, prior to rolling the die the non-phasing player has to option to use reaction movement to reinforce a position or, as often, withdraw so that the attacker hits an empty hex. Set piece operations against guerrillas require careful preparation, and it takes a lot of resources to surround target concentrations in order to ensure destruction. Thus the favorite operational tactic of the US side is to move airmobile units directly into the target hex, attempting overrun while undergoing ambush, and strongly support with air and artillery (when in-range). Battles in the game are typically mobile affairs pitting forces at hand, classically depicting the doctrines of light infantry tactics using stealthy surprise and ambush vs airmobility and heavy firepower. - - - - - - - - - - - - The Game... Prior to the game I had been in correspondence with Professor Charles Kamps of the US Air Force War College, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell AFB Alabama. The ACSC has a bit of interest in the game as a possible training aid (yes, I'm flattered), though no such decision has been made yet. During our correspondence Prof. Kamps indicated that there is some opinion amongst historians and military authorities that the best US strategy for the war would have been to invade Laos and block the Ho Chi Minh trail on a permanent basis. This strategem was not tested during playtesting; we did an invasion of North Vietnam which ended in a wild nuclear shootin' match with the 22 Chicom divisions that intervened, and final US victory, and also tried the historical US strategy (that one emulated history; an NVA victory). So, I was curious naturally to try this strategy. I gave some thought to US operations and possible NVA responses. Prof. Kamps is, by the way, writing an article on a US Laotian gambit to appear in an as - yet undetermined magazine. This article will include a fully detailed plan of battle for the hypothetical US operation and looks like eminently worthwhile reading. I decided to use all optional rules in the game, as I like them! Rules I didn't bother to employ included free fire zones and chemical warfare, both potentially costly in vp without commensurate worth in most situations, in my opinion. Nukes were left open for desparate circumstances. - - - 1964: First I deployed my 6 ARVN and 1 US unit in occupation of key areas, such as the ports, Saigon, one or two key airbases and Can Tho in the delta. The 7th fleet I placed at sea in support of the ARVN in Hue and Quang Tri. Next, the 4 VC and 1 supply were mixed up and deployed face down in So. Vietnamese mountain hexes, one per hex. The NVA were deployed in Hanoi, Haiphong and Thanh Hoa. US strategy initially was to build up and wait until spring '65, when the US side could commit ground forces at a lower vp cost than during the presidential election year 1964. Then, limit VC advances while awaiting the completion of US force increments, strategically bombing No. Vietnam to limit NVA resources, and finally enter Laos sometime in '67 when ready. The NVA side also opted to be a bit conservative at first. The NVA player gets vp when there are at least 9 VC units in South Vietnam, and NVA infiltration is limited to one division per turn prior to US commitment. Late in '64 the NVA side is in fair position to begin aggressive operations aimed at reducing the initial vp level, which starts the game at 65. Typically, the NVA side has a pretty good run at reducing the vp track significantly until '67, when the US buildup finally reaches a level where that player can start to do real damage to the VC. At that point, it is only a year until TET, when the VC have a good chance to really hurt the US, perhaps even run the VP track to 0 and automatically win. If not, certainly cripple the US side and win the game in the long term. I began the first turn, which is Summer '64 and only has a US bombardment phase, by making air attacks against VC units in the south. I succeded only in disrupting one VC 2-7 regiment. Throughout the rest of the year both sides built up. During the winter the NVA side successfully made a terror raid and struck an ungarrissoned town, though in this latter operation air power helped the garrisson fight the overrun off. The year ended with the vp level still well above 50. The NVA side smartly set up the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos, paving it with one unit per hex (mostly Pathet Lao but also NVA) two hexes wide. They thus somewhat pre-empted the effectiveness of US SOF and that pesky Hmong guerilla unit. A corridor three hexes wide and occupied was planned for '65 when more NVA units were on the board. - - - 1965: The NVA successfully took a couple of towns with overruns in the spring and summer, and executes frightening terror raids. In the spring, the US commits ground troops as expected, and the vp scale starts downward as US brings on forces as fast as possible to prevent a big VC rampage on ARVN towns. US Pacification and Search and Destroy die rolls all fail until the winter turn, way worse than statistically expected results. Soviet aid began immediately with US commitment of ground forces, though Chinese aid did not roll in until the fall. The US delays the air attack on the north until Fall '65, awaiting new air units and the proper garrisoning of airbases. This was a serious mistake. NVA air defenses grew rapidly, and many NVA units successfully trekked south. Airpower did do some damage to the VC and NVA units which reached the south, but not enough to justify the delay. NVA began to run the vp track way down. Finally in Fall '65 the US Air Force and Navy bombed and mined the north, losing one air unit to SAMS while neutralizing the rate of NVA buildup, mining Haiphong and taking out NVA air defenses. It would take nearly a year for this to have noticeable effect in the game, however. - - - 1966: At the start of the year, the vp track fell below 40! The VC and NVA supporting forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia were strong and the US buildup did not seem to have accomplished much. The NVA used the Korean Political Event gambit and succeeded in drawing off a carrier and the 199th infantry brigade. The CV returned after a turn fortunately, as the US side needed every air unit it could scrape together every turn. The VC briefly occupied Quang Tri as US forces focused on operations to clear the central highlands around Kontum and Pleiku. The vp track fell to 31 by summer and below soon after. I actually considered authorizing employment of tactical nuclear weapons as a desperate measure to redress the situation, but decided against it due to vp costs and the consideration that time, in the games' near term, was in the US favor. Signs of US preparations for the Laos gambit became evident by summer as defenses around Khe Sanh and the DMZ strengthened. As NVA, I had considered that a good counter to a US Laos attack would be pre-emption. Accordingly, in the fall I made the biggest single error of the game when I sent the bulk of the NVA into a wild attack across the Plain of Jars in Laos. The operation began in summer with an attack on Savannakhet. Initially, overrunning forces were driven off with airpower but the second effort succeeded and took the town. On the next turn the NVA made it's big move on Vientene. The US allied Hmong had moved into supporting position in the jungles and hills adjacent to Vientene and this was crucial in detecting NVA divisions moving to the attack. Four separate NVA efforts were defeated, and finally the strong NVA 324B division itself was wiped out in an attack on the town. The NVA in Laos lay gutted at the end of the turn, just as the effect of US bombing of the north finally kicked in. Winter of '66 witnessed the beginning of a US drive into Laos. The advance was methodical and deliberate, one hex at a time with the rear well secured. The NVA response was weak at kindest; they fell back. It was 'victory fever' that had seduced me into trying the Laotian gambit, the result of too-easy NVA victories early in the game. The same sort of victory fever that suckered the allies into the ill-fated Arnhem operation in 1944, and MacArthur into driving to the Yalu in 1950. (History repeating itself, even in a game format?) If I'd have been a real NVA general, I probably would have been shot as a 'Soviet spy'(!) as several of General Giap's associates reportedly were after the military 'failure' of Tet. The year ended with less than 9 communist units in So. Vietnam (no vp!) and the vp track slowly heading up towards 30. US fortunes seem to reach a quantum point in every game, and begin to rise directly after a certain point in time. - - - 1967: In the spring US forces took Tchepone and moved one hex beyond toward Savanakhet. The trail began to look interdicted, and NVA moved units trying to get through the gap before it was closed. Placement of the Agent Orange marker and bombing prevented many of these from making it, though one strong division and a couple of supply units passed through. The NVA side was still too weak to do much about the US drive into Laos. In summer, a US Marine division was destroyed in an ambush near Quang Ngai, costing - 2vp and greatly upsetting the US side. Firebases are deployed to Laos, and the NVA no longer attempts to send units through the small gap. In the fall, the US Air Force returns to NVA air defenses, taking out the headquarters of the air defense and again suppressing the interlocking effectiveness of SAMS and interceptors and generally running amok, knocking down bridges and other things the NVA side really needed. In Laos, the 101st closes the Ho Chi Minh trail for good with a smart operation, using airmobility to overrun a PL guerrilla near Savanakhet. The NVA side considers operations in central Laos in support of Tet, planned for the new year. Other darker thinking clouds the mind of the NVA commander in chief. The year ends with US airstrikes targetted to disrupt communist Tet operations. The battleship New Jersey deploys near the DMZ and makes life miserable for NVA in the North Vietnam panhandle. - - - 1968: The year opens with a failed US commando raid to free the prisoners from the Son Tay POW camp. The SOF outfit has reportedly been compromised by high level KGB spies in the US administration and the force is ambushed near Hanoi and wiped out to a man, an evil omen for the US side to begin such a decisive year on (-1 vp). VC terror raids on airbases around Saigon fail. The VC roared out of the swamps and jungles to strike Rach Gia, Quan Long, Qui Nhon, Kontum, An Loc, and block the coastal highway. In Laos, Vientene falls to a surprise overrun by the 325C division and in Cambodia the NVA makes the biggest surprise of all by striking Siem Riep, taking the city despite massive support from B-52 "Buff" bombers. In retrospect this attack by the NVA was their second biggest mistake, as it deprived them (me) of vital sanctuary later on during the campaign. What I had in mind at the time though was an expanding Khmer Rouge guerrilla war, bleeding the US side of vp or resources every turn. The KR only had one unit to start, and were never able to build up in any way. US power, secured by the strategic barrage of units in Laos, was free to deal with the KR as it would. Most VC attacks failed, except at Rach Gia and Quan Long. On the coast, a really wild series of battles occurred north of Cam Ranh Bay as 3 strong VC regiments moved to take key towns. Bombing stopped the operation cold, and US Marines and ANZUS mopped the VC up readily. The 1st Air Cav retook Qui Nhon and the ARVN attacked into the 'Parrots Beak' to open the road to Pnomh Penh. Destruction of the VC and NVA is fearful, with 7 regiments and 2 divisions sacrificed for marginal gains (-6 vp total). The allies began a methodical counterattack everywhere. Northern air defense networks are hit hard again, and a SAM is destroyed inside northern Laos. US allied units move into Cambodia and assist the Cambodians to garrisson towns and cities. Siem Riep is eventually retaken by Cambodian airmobile and US air. By the end of the year the vp track is solidly in the high 30's. The US side mulls retaking Vientene and calling for negotiations. - - - 1969: The US attempts the Political Event gambit of playing the USSR against China but fails the die roll, missing out on the +5 vp. Operation Phoenix is put into effect with good success and throughout the remainder of the game the VC are hobbled seriously as CIA hit teams infiltrate and eliminate the 'Cong leadership cadre's. The VC are never again able to muster sufficient force to be more than a local threat inside South Vietnam, especially without NVA units to break down and provide quick reinforcement or to threaten the ARVN bordelands. A big battle with the VC near Pleiku during the monsoon season turns into a massacre in the highlands, which thereafter are practically clear of VC. In Cambodia, all towns and cities are sufficiently garrissoned and the fledgling Khmer Rouge, under intense bombing attack and lacking any NVA support whatsoever, is barely able to stay in existence in mountain hideouts. In Laos, the NVA is never able to build sufficiently to think of challenging the US forces, at this time 7 divisions strong in country. The mining of Haiphong and intermittent focused bombing attacks on Hanoi have suppressed the NVA air defenses and introduction of Soviet aid units sufficiently that the armor and artillery units never enter the game. Chinese aid has helped keep the NVA infantry forces at strength but with the Ho Chi Minh trail closed they have little they can do to change the balance in the game. About the only option not taken by the NVA is an invasion of Thailand, and due to the +8vp, the entry of two Thai divisions and 5 additional 'free' US units, plus paucity of vp towns, this is not an attractive option. All I could think of to do was hold on for the time being. In the summer '69 turn the 101st airmobile retakes Vientene in an air assault attack spearheading a general US drive up the Mekong valley. In the fall turn, the US offer's negotiations. The NVA accepts, having no choice as their air defenses again lay shattered by the latest concentrated US air campaign. I consider the NVA situation overnight and decide to concede the game at this point, to myself. If the NVA and US sides stay the course, a US runup to 99 victory points, sufficient to guarantee a US Substantive Victory is a certainty by sometime in '72 or '73, barring unexpected circumstance. - - - In the real world AND in the game, such a US victory as described was not a certainty. There is nothing to force an NVA player to concede in 1969 and it is conceivable a determined player could tire the US guy out in a few years. Certainly, such a rude NBA (oops, I meant NVA) player could negotiate a downgraded US victory to Marginal in return for ceasing the game. For a US player determined to last until at least '75 there is nothing I can think of to keep a US Substantive victory from happenning, however. I was satisfied that I had achieved what I wanted out of the game. In the real world, it seems to me probable that the US would have attempted Vietnamization at this point, and it is a question whether the ARVN could have held the Laotian door closed. Certainly, with total US airpower always readily available and a slow US withdrawal they would have had a good chance. I did not think it worth it to continue as the NVA, game wise. The NVA would probably never have given in so easily. Someday they would have tried again, somehow. Using international politics would probably have afforded them the best chance, in the 20th century, to accomplish their objectives. The question I wonder about is whether their regime would have been as adroit at international politics if they had failed in the first war with the US to reunify the country.