From: "Henrik Lawaetz" Subject: [GCACW] Replay: PBEMTest5 - In Pursuit of Stonewall (long) PBEMTest5 - In Pursuit of Stonewall ################################### Gentlemen, This is an edited version of the 'Game Evaluation' for a multi-player GCACW based game. The game was played "blind" - player identities were (and still ARE!) secret and, furthermore, players 'saw' only their own units and stuff within "scouting range" of these. All inter-player communications went via the GM (me), and was edited slightly to prevent players from recognizing each other. I labeled this game "PBEMTest5", as it is the fifth in a series of games I have run to develop a workable moderated PBEM system for GCACW. I have also run these to assemble a group of interested and committed players to run a more ambitious game next year. The particular rationale for PBEMTest5 was that 1) I wanted to try the system out in a highly mobile setting, and 2) several players from previous games had seen very little action and needed some more active 'practice'. This game featured the Early June 1862 period in the Shenandoah Valley - Stonewall Jackson has just beaten McDowell and Fremont to Strassburg, thus beating Lincoln's master plan which called for McDowell and Fremont cutting him off. That time is where the game starts. The SIV Middle and South Maps were used. The game was very interesting and exciting, with some unusual twists along the way; and it had a very unique and surprising outcome. It may help having these maps on hand if you want to follow the details of this replay. The game was played from August 30 (first turn deadline) until October 22, eight weeks all in all, with one game day played (three sub-turns) per real life week. There was one player for each historical division commander and above. Several players had another player assigned for backup and to provide a 'sparring' partner. If you have questions or comments about this game format, please direct them to me. Overview of the main sections of this mail: ------------------------------------------- 1. Scenario Specs for the scenario. Of course, the players did not know all of this. 2. Objectives What the players were told to try to achieve, a kind of "victory conditions". 3. Chronology Day-by-day account on what happened (i.e. the replay). 4. Overall Outcome Who won and why. 5. Technical Evaluation Game system stuff. What went well, what did not. 6. Individual Evaluations The GMs very subjective view about how the players did. 7. Extracts from Player Comments Selected (by GM) parts of the post-game player comments. Yours, Henrik *************************************** 1. Scenario ###################################################### Philosophy ---------- The previous game, PBEMTest4, was a head-on slugfest battle, with little room for maneuver. As the game progressed, map edges came to play an increasing tactical role. This time around, I wanted a mobile situation, which means map edges might be even worse. So looking for plenty of space, I quickly decided on the Shenandoah Valley as the setting. As for scenario, I prefer a historically plausible situation, but ideally one that does not already have a well defined order-of-battle in GCACW. With the relative slow tempo of PBEM, I also needed a situation with a relatively short time frame - long idle periods can make the game drag. None of the existing scenarios really suited my needs. Studying the superb "Game as History" section of the game for a long time, I decided to use the Early June 1862 situation. This time was very active and mobile, but not the direct focus of any existing scenario. Union Forces Background ----------------------- My personal take on the historical situation end of May 31 1862 is a Union strategic plan gone wrong, a plan which one of the primary players - McDowell - never believed much in. The aftermath of this failure was a half-hearted pursuit, which achieved nothing except to offer Jackson the chance to select the time and place for another showdown at his leisure. The result was rather foreseeable: a Confederate tactical victory in the twin battles of Cross Key and Port Republic, with a further boost in Jackson*s prestige and a critical delay for McDowell*s favored scenario - the commitment of his forces alongside McClellan*s in a battle for Richmond. Obviously, the strict historical situation would not be a real challenge. The scenario I ended up with was "what if the Union command had been serious in pursuing Jackson". The sole change is in the mindset of the Union operational command (McDowell). This thus sees the Union with five divisions, facing just two Confederate ones, but the Union has several problems, using my PBEM system perhaps most importantly Command Control - Union overall command is divided between McDowell and Fremont. McDowell forces consisted of three divisions, Shields, Ricketts, and King's, all full-strength fresh forces. In order to simulate McDowell*s reluctance to pursue, he had standing orders to keep one full division (King*s) and himself in reserve near Front Royal/Strassburg, ready to move back to the Rappahannock area. Indeed, there was no "King" player. Once Jackson pulled back South, this left McDowell with a near-impossible task of coordinating operations from the far rear. Fremont*s command fought alongside McDowell*s divisions. Fremont fielded three independent brigades (strength-wise equivalent to a division), plus Blenker*s division. My feeling was that I needed to penalize Fremont*s command tactically, based on their abysmal historical performance. I made two provisions: 1) Fremont*s brigades had to activate individually, i.e. could not perform a group activation; 2) Blenker*s division got a combat penalty of -1, applicable to the Union side whenever any Union unit involved was from this division (this prevented *gamey* tactics, e.g. assigning these units to other units). I think these penalties probably reduced the effectiveness of Fremont*s forces quite a lot, possibly too much; overall, the combat worthiness of Fremont*s district as a whole was perhaps equal to one of McDowell*s divisions. The Union Lineup was thus: McDowell (commanding officer for Shields, Ricketts, and King) [King (division, non-player, controlled directly by McDowell)] Shields (division) Ricketts (division) Fremont (three brigades, plus commanding officer for Blenker) Blenker (division) Confederate Forces Background ----------------------------- The Confederate prospects seemed not too bad. Although outnumbered, the Confederates enjoyed an overall +1 in tactical ratings, plus increased mobility. More importantly, perhaps, the Confederates had no really critical territorial objectives to defend, and could operate more or less freely. Finally, Jackson and Ewell were the only Confederate tactical players, so command control should be relatively easy. I allowed them the opportunity to communicate pre-game as to what the overall strategy and immediate plans would be. As in normal SIV, the Confederates have but two cavalry SP, and I assigned one SP to Jackson and one to Ewell. I was worried that this did not sufficiently represent the Confederate cavalry effectiveness, so I tried to help a bit by decreasing the likelihood that cavalry was lost in a cavalry retreat with a special rule. I considered assigning a separate player to control the Confederate cavalry (an Ashby player!), but I was not convinced this would actually be helpful, and the player I offered this to loathed the idea. I ended up with using the player in question to play faraway Lee in Richmond instead. Lee had an array of potential reinforcements he could send to the Valley if he was convinced enough could be gained by doing so. This added a strategy element to the Confederate options: they could send sizable reinforcements to the Valley as Lee indeed did historically after June 10, or pull out post-haste. However, doing the former would fulfill the primary Union aim in the campaign, so there would have to be a big pay-off, and the latter would be a moral loss if some tactical success had not been achieved previously. Reinforce, leave as was, or pull out: This was the decision that the Lee player would be faced with in the game. For reinforcements to be effective within the time frame of the game, Jackson would have to fall back pretty far, and Lee would have to send them relatively early, as they would take some time in arriving. There was one catch, one flaw in the Confederate situation - all the Confederate units started the game Exhausted, and half the units were Disorganized as well, following their recent rapid marches. Jackson*s forces badly needed a rest, at least before undertaking any tactical counter-offensive. Confederate Line-up: -------------------- Lee (off-map, reinforcements available for sending to the Valley) Jackson (division, commanding officer for Ewell) Ewell (division) Whiting [later] (division, part of Lee's reinforcements) Orders of Battle ---------------- Confederate - Army of Northern Virginia Reserves ************************************************* (Richmond, Offmap) RE Lee (Commander) (Richmond, Offmap) Whiting (ANV, Div, Leader) (Richmond, Offmap) Law (Whiting, Brig, 5 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) Hood (Whiting, Brig, 5 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) Hampton (Whiting, Brig, 4 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) Hatton (Whiting, Brig, 4 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) Pettigrew (Whiting, Brig, 4 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) Lawton (Brig, 8 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) Branch (Brig, 7 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) Mahone (Brig, 6 inf, 1 art) (Richmond, Offmap) 3 VA (Reg, 1 cav) Confederate - Army of the Valley ******************************** M3911 Jackson (Army of the Valley Commander, Jackson's Division Leader) M4506 Winder (Jackson, Brig, 4 inf, 2 art, Disorg, Exh, F1) M3911 Patton (Jackson, Brig, 4 inf, 1 art, Exh, F1) M3811 Taliaferro (Jackson, Brig, 3 inf, 1 art, Exh, F1) M4310 2/6 VA (Reg, 1 cav, Exh) [assigned to Jackson] M3712 Ewell (Division, Leader) M3612 Taylor (Ewell, Brig, 5 inf, 1 art, Exh, F1) M3612 Trimble (Ewell, Brig, 5 inf, 1 art, Disorg, Exh, F1) M3712 Elzey (Ewell, Brig, 3 inf, Exh, F1) M3712 Steuart (Ewell, Brig, 3 inf, 2 art, Disorg, Exh, F1) M3809 Ashby (Brig, 1 cav, 1 art) [assigned to Ewell] S2629 Virginia Militia (Reg, 2 inf, 1 art, Fort) Union - Department of the Rappahannock ************************************** *M4615 McDowell (Dept of the Rappahannock, Commander) M4614 4 Pa (Reg, 1 cav) M4615 Shields (Dept of the Rappahannock, Division, Leader) M4615 Kimball (Shields, Brig, 5 inf, 1 art) M4615 Ferry (Shields, Brig, 5 inf, 2 art) M4615 Tyler (Shields, Brig, 5 inf, 2 art) M4615 Carroll (Shields, Brig, 5 inf) M4516 1 Pa (Reg, 1 cav) [assigned to Shields] M4915 Ricketts (Dept of the Rappahannock, Division, Leader) M4915 Duryea (Ricketts, Brig, 6 inf, 2 art) M4916 Tower (Ricketts, Brig, 6 inf, 1 art) M5016 Hartsuff (Ricketts, Brig, 6 inf, 1 art) M5014 1 RI (Reg, 1 cav) [assigned to Ricketts] *M5816 King (Dept of the Rappahannock, Division) *M5816 Augur (King, Brig, 6 inf, 2 art) *M5816 Patrick (King Brig, 6 inf, 1 art) *M5816 Gibbon (King, Brig, 8 inf, 1 art) *M5816 1 NJ (Reg, 1 cav) [assigned to King] * If the Confederates moved south, these units were restricted to stay in reserve near Front Royal and Strassburg. Union - Department of the Shenandoah ************************************ (Banks' forces had been mentioned as the briefing for McDowell, but there were no circumstances where these units would come into active play) Union - Mountain Department *************************** M3306 Fremont (Mtn Dept, Commander) M3406 Cluseret (Mtn, Brig, 4 inf, 1 art) M3306 Milroy (Mtn, Brig, 4 inf, 2 art) M3205 Schenck (Mtn, Brig, 4 inf) M3606 4 NY (Reg, 1 cav) M3902 1 WV (Reg, 1 cav) M3106 Blenker (Mtn, Division, Leader) M3106 Stahel (Blenker, Brig, 5 inf, 1 art) M3005 Steinwehr (Blenker, Brig, 4 inf, 1 art) M2906 Bohlen (Blenker, Brig, 5 inf, 1 art) 2. OBJECTIVES ###################################################### Union Objectives **************** If Jackson made a stand near Strassburg or North thereof, all Union forces should be committed to destroy him there. However, assuming Jackson fled South as expected, the Union should take steps to ensure he stayed there, and launch a vigorous pursuit to see if they could not punish his overconfidence, somehow. To guard against Jackson slipping back around Union forces and moving North in such a case, McDowell with King's division had to remain near Front Royal. They had to be ready to move back east to the Rappahannock area if that was needed, or do so on their own initiative whenever the situation was secure enough to allow it, i.e. if Jackson ceased being a threat. Meanwhile, Fremont's department, including Blenker*s division, and Shields' and Ricketts' divisions (both under McDowell's strategic directions) were available for the pursuit of Jackson. The objectives here were to a) Maintain Union forces in good order, and b) Inflict a crushing defeat on Jackson, avenging past reverses, and/or c) Drive Jackson out of the Valley, and/or d) Stabilize the situation, so all of McDowell's forces could be pulled back to the Rappahannock position. Jackson could then no longer be a threat to the upper Valley area, namely the B&O RR. Union Pre-game Plan ******************* There really was none. Historically, Lincoln's effort to bag Jackson had failed when Jackson beat Fremont and Shields to Strassburg. Thus, the Union players were not permitted to discuss strategy before play began. Instead, Union plans had to be developed *on the fly* during play. (Extract from McDowell's first-turn communications with Fremont) The opportunity to eliminate the enemy's Valley forces from the strategic situation in Virginia is still within our grasp. I have ordered General Shields' division to hold the enemy in the vicinity of Strasburg while General Ricketts' division marches to New Market via the Luray Pike. General King's division is marching to Front Royal, but is three days away from providing General Shields any possible support. (Abbreviated from Fremont's first-turn instructions to Blenker) As you can see, our previous plans have failed (pre-game). I will try to advance towards M4506 Newton with my forces, in an effort to locate and to pinpoint the enemy forces. We have reports that a force of (16 inf, 4 art) are in Strasburg. I want your division to prevent these enemy forces from escaping westwards into the mountains. When we determine the number and condition of the Rebel forces, and I have linked up with McDowell's forces, we shall make a concerted push South. Confederate Objectives ********************** Jackson had already foiled the Union grand scheme by evading Lincoln's trap. The Confederate forces were almost in the clear - this was the wrap-up. The objectives thus were to a) Reestablish their forces in good order and stable position, and b) Inflict yet more reverses on the already frustrated Union opponents, and/or c) Keep large numbers of Union forces occupied while Lee deals with McClellan, and d) Get into a position where the Confederates could potentially pull all of Jackson*s forces back to Richmond. Confederate Pre-game Plan ************************* In contrast to their Union opponents, Jackson and Ewell were given the opportunity to communicate before play began. (Abbreviated from Jackson's instructions to Ewell) We are in a difficult situation. According to my information, we are outnumbered 3 to 1. We must reorganize our troops and avoid being crushed between both Union forces (Fremont 13,000; McDowell 25,000). I intend to try and avoid combat as much as possible: my priority is to keep our army alive. We should only give battle if we can catch one or two isolated Union brigades. If circumstances are particularly favorable, we might even be able to win a battle against Fremont's command or against a single division of McDowell's command, but I consider it unlikely. Cavalry: We have very little cavalry, and it is very important that we save it. It might be very helpful to cover a possible retreat, should we suffer a defeat. Consequently, our cavalry should be used for recon only and avoid combat as much as possible. Your orders: For the next two or three days, we will rest our army and start an orderly withdrawal southwards through Mt Jackson. You should rest and reorganize as much as possible near Strasburg until my division reaches Strasburg. Then we will move south together. We must be ready to attack our pursuers, should the opportunity arise. 3. CHRONOLOGY ###################################################### June 1, 1862 ------------ Jackson wants to rest his forces while awaiting the return of the stray brigade, Winder's "Stonewall" brigade. This unit rejoins Jackson's other units around Strassburg by noon. Ashby is sent East towards M4615 Front Royal to keep an eye on the approaching Federals, and this reveals that Shields' division is approaching faster than expected, and that further Union forces are not far behind. On the Union side, Shields cautiously advances towards M3712 Strassburg. Ricketts moves to M4615 Front Royal, and then embarks on his flanking move, south in the Luray Valley. He makes excellent progress on the first day. Ashby is in the area, and reports the fact that Union unit are moving south in the Luray Valley. North of M3712 Strassburg, Fremont moves out North of the Confederates, boldly deploying in a thin east-west line. Blenker's division starts what becomes a slow crawl southwestward through the mountains - the aim being to get behind Jackson if he makes a stand. However, Jackson decides against fighting a battle at Strassburg, and pulls back late in the southwards. Fremont and Shields' forces meet at Strassburg. June 2, 1862 ------------ Ricketts continues his flanking march, not as fast as on June 1, but still making reasonable progress. M3332 Luray is reached by the end of the day, with advance units getting as far as M3032 Hamburg. Ashby receives orders to move out in front of Ricketts' units, orders that are impractical when they arrive, as the Union forces he is to block are far south of him at that time. Instead, Ashby observes the last Union division, King's, deploying between Strassburg and Front Royal, while he rests his unit. He then tries to rejoin the main Confederate force, but does not succeed in doing so until June 5. Fremont and Shields try to pursue Jackson and Ewell, but Fremont fails to make any real progress, and Jackson manages to stay well clear of Shields. Blenker's mountain expedition makes some progress, but does not really reach a position from where they can threaten Jackson's flank. Also, Blenker's units take different paths and get quite widely separated. On this day, Ewell and Jackson manage to rest all their units, save for Winder's brigade and the cavalry. June 3, 1862 ------------ Rain starts falling, slowing down everyone's movements. Fremont, Blenker, and Shields take advantage and rest their units, while Jackson and Ewell do not push too hard southwards, reaching M2226 Mt Jackson by nightfall. The only hard marching this day is done by Ricketts. He crosses the White House Bridge and reaches M2133 New Market by nightfall, at the cost of some stragglers. However, his cavalry is not up and no Confederates are in sight. Ricketts misinterprets a report from Shields, believing that Shields is engaged with Jackson much further to the North. At this time, Jackson and Ewell are unaware of Ricketts' presence at New Market. Lee is worried. Based on appeals for reinforcements from Jackson, Lee decides to send Whiting with two brigades. He will take some time getting there, though. Lee sends Jackson instructions to change his overall plan to allow him to meet up with Whiting. June 4, 1862 ------------ Rain stops. Jackson incorrectly assumes that the Shenandoah North Fork is a Major River, and thus still unfordable. He therefore directs his and Ewell's forces across the Meen's Bottom Bridge (M2227/M2228), and then burns the bridge, believing this will prevent the Union forces from following for the rest of the day. However, the Shenandoah North Fork is a Minor River, thus fordable. Having just crossed the river and burned the bridge, the discovery of Ricketts already in position at New Market (occupying M2223, M2332 Bushong's Mill, and M2333) is a shock. Jackson immediately orders Ewell to maneuver against Ricketts, trying to avoid combat, but attacking at his discretion - essentially giving him a free hand. Ewell decides that the Union position in M2332 Bushong's Mill is key to the position, and orders a preparatory move for an all-out assault with his entire division against this position. However, surprise is not limited to the Confederate side. The appearance of the entire Confederate Valley Army seemingly out of nowhere has unnerved Ricketts. His fellow Union forces are nowhere to be seen. Not wanting to fight alone, he decides to pull back a bit southwards, readjusting his position to a shorter line in M2133 New Market and M2233. He thus abandons the Bushong's Mill position and, more importantly, uncovers the New Market Gap across the Massanutten Mountain (hexes M2333 - M2633). Ewell now faces a difficult decision - he cannot be sure that there are no sizable Federal units on the other side of the pass, but he decides it is possible and worth a try. He moves towards all his forces towards the pass, occupying M2333 with two brigades by evening. Much to his relief, there are no Federals in the pass. Meanwhile, Shields followed by Fremont moves up into the rear of the Confederate forces, crossing all units over the Shenandoah North Fork by the end of the day, fearing that continued Rain would prevent them from doing so on June 5. Blenker emerges from his mountains and two of his brigades manage to establish contact with Ricketts at M2031. More importantly, they trigger a cavalry retreat for the 2/6 VA Confederate cavalry, which eliminates this unit. With Ashby still not back, the Confederate Valley Army is temporarily 'blind'. June 5, 1862 ------------ The rain stops. Ricketts realizes the blunder he has just committed by uncovering the Gap. He wastes no time in informing his fellow Union generals, also stating that he is certain that Jackson will try to escape through the New Market Gap - and that he, Ricketts, is unable to prevent that. Indeed, Ewell, in tactical command, makes the call that all forces are going that way. Jackson personally commands the rearguard. This is hit by an immediate attack from Shields, which routs Jackson and that brigade - but the retreat brings the unit into the Gap, covered by other Confederate forces. A follow-up attack against the next two brigades just West of the Gap dislodges those, but Union casualties are considerable. By nightfall, all forces of the Valley Army are in the Gap, having only lost 1 inf and 1 cav thus far - Union casualties are about the same, so this is not bad given that the entire Confederate force was virtually surrounded at one point. This is the deciding point in the game - the Union had caught Jackson, but has then let him escape virtually unscathed. A new strategy is now needed, and there is no Union Supreme commander on the spot to make a fast decision. However, miraculously, the Union commanders come up with a plan on the fly: Shields keeps up the pressure on Jackson in the Gap, Fremont crosses the Massanutten Mountain to the North via Ross' Gap (M2827), while Ricketts crosses South thereof, through S5004 Catherine Furnace. Blenker takes a wide sweep to the South, all the way around the Massanutten Mountain range and shall then move north. Indeed, the brilliance of this plan is not the plan itself - it is the speed at which it is decided upon and put into execution. Ricketts informs everyone of his blunder by June 5 AM. Both Fremont and Ricketts start moving June 5 Noon, and by June 5 PM when Jackson and Ewell are congratulating themselves on their escape, a new threat is already under development, rapidly. The only dissenting voice to this new plan is McDowell, who is understandably concerned about splitting up the Union forces, thus giving Jackson the chance to possibly hit and destroy them in isolation. However, he is far from the front and his opinion is not heard before early the following day, at which time it is too late to stop. June 6, 1862 ------------ Jackson's division is exhausted after yesterdays' desperate dash to get out, and one brigade, the rearguard, is even demoralized. Ewell's forces are in excellent shape, and Ashby has by now rejoined the Valley Army. Wanting to retake the initiative, Jackson decides to rest his division in the Gap, thus blocking the Union from following, but sends Ewell on a raid north the seize M4615 Front Royal. He is not aware that a full Union division, King's, is there, making the venture impractical from the onset. Ashby is to scout for Ewell, which leaves Jackson without recon assets. However, worried about this, Jackson changes his mind and asks Ewell to send Ashby to scout the route Fremont is coming along. However, the position Jackson wants Ashby at, is at the time of the order already occupied by Fremont! Fremont wastes no time and pushes ahead, crossing the Shenandoah South Fork and occupies a flanking position near Luray, in M3131 and M3231 by June 6 AM. While Ewell immediately cancels all thought of moving North against Front Royal, but Jackson is not impressed. He only moves one brigade, one he borrowed from Ewell earlier, out of the Gap. By June 6 Noon, the vanguard of Ricketts' forces are in full view in S5203. Only now does Jackson see the potential trouble he is in, and orders a hasty retreat out of the Gap, towards Luray, On June 6 PM. But it is too late. The Union wins the first three initiatives on the PM turn, and Ricketts' forces move out and blocks Jackson's forces from leaving the Gap, also cutting the communication between the Confederate commanders. To add to Jackson's already serious problems, Shields' times an attack to perfection, hitting Jackson's forces in the Gap moments after Ricketts' arrive on the other side. The attack fails to dislodge Jackson, but disorganizes his forces and spoils Jackson's plans to rest. Meanwhile, Fremont and Ewell keep each other occupied with a little maneuvering, but no combat. While this is just fine with Fremont, Ewell cannot afford to waste time at this point. He might have maneuvered to help Jackson, just in case Jackson did not make it out, but the presence of Fremont made that a difficult call to make. As it transpires, Ewell expects Jackson to emerge from the Gap, but instead by nightfall learns that all communications have been severed. June 7, 1862 ------------ Ricketts is now in a difficult position, trying to keep Jackson bottled up AND preventing Ewell from relieving him. However, he is greatly aided by the rain, which starts falling. Although it makes Jackson's defense a bit easier, it also makes Ewell's relief very difficult - first his approach is slowed, then he is limited to the two bridges, the most direct one being the White House Bridge. Ricketts positions one brigade behind this, and blocks the more southern Columbia Bridge, at S5303 Honeyville, with another brigade, which advances as far as M2934 Leaksville. Ricketts' last brigade blocks Jackson's sortie in M2633, and hoping to support Shields, Ricketts even launches an attack on Jackson from there, but this effort is a bit overly optimistic, and it fails. Meanwhile, Jackson bides his time, awaiting better weather. Shields attacks Jackson in the Gap again, but the rain contributes to him achieving little. Jackson consolidates his forces into essentially one strong brigade, just in case he is forced to retreat through Union units. Ewell attacks and Ricketts brigade covering the Columbia Bridge is forced back from M2934 Leaksville, but it still blocks this escape route in S5302. Ewell also tries to assault Ricketts brigade across the White House Bridge into M2733 with a single brigade. However, attacking across a bridge and the rain combine to make the whole business a no-win scenario. He achieves nothing save to add to the Confederate casualty list. Meanwhile, seeing Ewell move back west from Luray towards the White House Bridge, Fremont cautiously moves into Luray, and turns west. Ewell's own position, near an unfordable river and with Fremont in his rear, is becoming very dangerous. June 8, 1862 ------------ The skies clear, and Ewell believing that the river is fordable wastes a turn trying an impossible maneuver. Instead, as Fremont follows him closely, Ewell turns around and tries to clear his escape route, attacking Fremont in M3032. However, his assault plan is too complex, involving one brigade moving into flanking position, followed by a full corps assault. The flanking brigade, Trimble's, is caught in M3033 by a counterattack from Fremont, which negates the flanking and the Confederate assault fails, badly. Trimble's brigade is forced to retreat east, out of harm's way. But more importantly, Ewell is too hard pressed to make any attempt to cross the Shenandoah South Fork all day; Jackson has to try to get out all by himself. And Jackson does try to break out at June 8 AM. The attempt is well timed, and has a very good chance of success (with Jackson's tactical rating and the +1 assault bonus providing a net +2 attack). But luck has not been on the side of the South these last few days, and the attack fails miserably. Of course, a successful attack here would not have been enough to save Jackson, but it might have been closer. At June 8 Noon, instead, Shields hits Jackson, and this time, on Shields' third try, Jackson can no longer hold his ground. His units are forced to retreat through Ricketts' brigade on the other side, with the resulting massive loss - all of Jackson's artillery is lost, along with a lot of troops. Worse, the survivors do not reach safety, but find themselves surrounded and caught between the River and Ricketts units. From: "Henrik Lawaetz" Subject: [GCACW] Replay: PBEMTest5 - In Pursuit of Stonewall (long) Ricketts immediately, June 8 PM, follows up on Shields' success, and eliminates the remnants of Jackson's division. He even has enough resources to move units into positions to block Ewell from escaping across the river on the next turn. These two actions effectively seal the win for the Union. Having performed a wide sweep South around the Massanutten Mountains (taking a shortcut via S4611 Loker's Mill), Blenker's forces begin to arrive behind Ricketts. Their commander anxious has been frustrated with his seemingly pointless assignment and is eager to get into action. Consequently, the division has been marching pretty hard, and they have lost quite a few stragglers on the way. Whiting's meager forces (two infantry brigades and one cavalry regiment) arrive at S2629 Staunton, and immediately move north, making good progress. But Whiting is several days' marching away from the showdown at the White House Bridge. (With the issue no longer in any doubt, I called a halt to the Game at this point) June 9, 1862 ------------ (Pure conjecture, not actually played, based entirely on the GMs imagination) Following Jackson's surrender, Ewell finds himself in a very bad position, alone and surrounded by enemies and rivers on all sides. Following a brief battle, Ewell manages to escape with Trimble's brigade, only. The remaining Confederate forces die or surrender. Aftermath --------- (More GM speculation) Lee realizes the enormity of the defeat by June 10 Noon. Whiting's forces are hastily recalled to Richmond. Confederate morale suffers, as the Union press magnifies this defeat. McDowell reorganizes the forces of his District, merges Banks forces into it and assumes command of the combined force, renamed the Army of Virginia (John Pope remains in the West). McDowell moves back East very soon afterwards. Fremont's Mountain department occupies the Valley with little further resistance, and plans for the liberation of Eastern Tennessee becomes a hot item on the Union agenda. But in the shorter term, the battle of Richmond follows, with McClellan and McDowell as the aggressive side. 4. OVERALL OUTCOME ###################################################### The Confederate Valley Army has been outmaneuvered and destroyed. Union casualties are considerable, but not excessive. All Union Scenario goals have been achieved. It is hard not to see this as a Strategic Union Victory. This game saw remarkable coordination and cooperation on the Union side. Even though these guys did not know each other, could not discuss strategy pre-game, and did not have a clear-cut command structure to begin with, all players seemed to immediately know what to do. They improvised new plans during play and performed coordinated maneuvers very unlike any Union real life generals. They immediately and consistently kept their fellow commanders informed about what they planned to do. There seemed to be very little internal rivalry - they were truly a team. I am not saying here that there were command problems or disunity on the Confederate side - there was none of that. There were, to be sure, many small tactical mistakes on both sides, and luck did play a part, but the Confederates were - with good reason - counting on some serious command difficulties for the Union. These never materialized, and I think that was the key factor. I doubt any future PBEM game I run will see any such cooperation. 5. TECHNICAL EVALUATION ###################################################### Scenario ******** I am quite pleased with the scenario except that the two SP of cavalry I gave the Confederates in no way simulate the capabilities the Confederates historically had in this branch. More Confederate cavalry was needed. Furthermore, I possibly penalized the Union Mountain department too heavily, tactically, but the players were able to cope with this admirably. PBEM System *********** Overall, cavalry is VERY important in PBEM, much more so than in FTF GCACW. In FTF, each cavalry sp represents about 750 men, against 500 men per infantry sp. Possibly, the difference is partially to be explained by some of the cavalry always being on patrol - we probably need to have 50 percent more cavalry SP in PBEM. In the middle of play, I made two small but important changes: 1) the order syntax now indicate whether an order has been carried out or is "in the pipeline"; and 2) the time-stamping of messages between players are now 'in sync' with combat and contact reports. This should make message timing easier to understand. As for system stuff, in an effort to make it easier to fight, I allowed grand and corps assaults to be conducted from multiple hexes. I have now realized, that this is not the case, so effective immediately, we are reverting to 'strict' GCACW, i.e. only units in the same hex can assault together. In PBEMTest5, several players used conditional orders successfully - there was some unclear aspects on what conditions one could base the various orders on, and all this and some syntax stuff need to be spelt out, with examples. I'll try to have that in place for the next version of the PBEM Guidelines. GCACW System ************ The weather rules worked OK in this game setting, misunderstandings about fording notwithstanding. There were suggestions earlier about having weather vary during the turn, e.g. it could sometimes rain on the AM turn, but not on the Noon and PM turns. More importantly, fordability could be less deterministic, i.e. like after the historical Gettysburg battle (which you might be have heard of :-)), the sides might not be fully aware of when the Potomac would subside enough to let the Confederates escape. I will keep this in mind, but I have no immediate plans to include such at this point. PBEMTest5 was played at the SIV scale: most units were brigades, with between 3 and 5 manpower, each. The other games usually see divisions square off. My personal opinion, reinforced by this game is, that the GCACW game system does not work as well on the SIV scale. Non-combat losses do not depend on unit size, and IMHO become too high. This applies to Cavalry Retreat, Extended Marching, and Force Marching. I suspect this was a big and understandable part of the reason why Jackson wanted to rest so badly in this game. I plan to use the standard GCACW scaling for future games, so this should not matter. Sometimes, combat losses tend to be too different for the sides engaged. Simply put, the victorious side generally suffers few casualties. Historically, actual losses were often very even, with the lopsided battles saw losses at one-to-two, at the most. I disliked the situation in this game, where Jackson, defending in his mountain pass with a certain unit size, could never suffer any loss/demoralization AND hold his position - meaning the Union could never weaken him - they either dislodged him with the catastrophic results for Jackson, or he held on. What I would like to see is perhaps a dual combat resolution, where actual combat losses and retreat results are resolved separately. Game Administration ******************* I made a rules error early on vis-a-vis cavalry retreat. There were some technical mail problems. Twice my work e-mail system caused errors that played havoc with my address lists. But my impression is, that I messed up far less than in PBEMTest4, and the execution was a lot smoother for me. Overall ******* Although there is still room for improvement for sure, I think my PBEM system is working well enough. Also, I have the handling routine pretty much worked in. So, I now feel up to declaring the 'test series' over - The next game will be entitled PBEMGame1 (or something like that)! 6. INDIVIDUAL EVALUATIONS ###################################################### CONFEDERATE ----------- Army of Northern Virginia (Lee) ******************************* Far away in Richmond, Lee had no real way of preventing what happened. Lee sensed that things were not going the right way, and decided to send reinforcements (Whiting with a small division). Although he did so pretty fast, this did not make any difference. Presumably, Lee gets the blame from the Confederate press - Joe Johnston will probably resume command of the Army of the Northern Virginia once he recovers from his Seven Pines wound. Army of the Valley and Jackson*s Division (Jackson) *************************************************** Lost his entire command, so, obviously, he did not win. But despite this, Jackson did not do so badly. Immediately saw that the main flaw in the Confederate armory in this scenario was cavalry shortage, and tried to take steps to reduce the likelihood of losses. Tried to retreat slowly, in order to rest and reorganize his men, which I felt and still feel was very sensible. His aim was to ready his men to turn on their pursuers any time the opportunity presented itself. Played well, except for two small but crucial errors: The first of these was when he thought that the Shenandoah North Fork (a Minor River) would be unfordable on June 4. His focus on getting across a bridge and burning this caused a bad situation, which his army was lucky to escape from, and relatively unscathed to boot. The second mistake was subtler. Hampered by too few recon assets, he had to guess as to the enemy*s intentions and abilities. He miscalculated the Union*s determination and ability to get around his position via mountain passes. He then sent Ewell with half the total force on an offensive errand, supported by the only cavalry unit left. Meanwhile, Jackson rested the rest of his men, blissfully ignorant of the impending danger until he suddenly found himself surrounded. Perhaps the proximity of the map edge between the Middle and South maps played a part here. Bad luck definitively played a part, as the Union won a key initiative roll. Jackson tried to break out, but even a base +2 attack failed to dislodge the enemy. Whatever good fortune he had in the escape from New Market was gone by this time. Ewell*s Division (Ewell) ************************ The initial Ewell player dropped out on June 1, so I had to call in a substitute player *on the fly*. This went well - I chose a veteran player from a previous game to take over, and the transition was not a problem. Jackson entrusted the Ewell player with most tactical decisions, and I think Ewell*s actions were nearly flawless until Jackson was trapped in the Mountain Pass. Here the Ewell player wasted crucial time coming to Jackson's rescue, and subsequently misinterpreted the rules regarding river fordability, as had Jackson before him, thus wasting another key turn trying to cross the unfordable river. I think the Ewell player then lost heart, perhaps feeling that his position was hopeless. He could have pulled out at this stage, but he refused to abandon Jackson and tried to break him out - eventually this cost his division, too. I know the Ewell player was happy to be spared having to play the final (June 9) turn, and he claims to be eager to redeem himself in future games! Whiting*s Division (Whiting) **************************** Only had the chance to play about one game day, and never spotted the enemy. At least he can take comfort in the fact, that he was the only Confederate player to emerge blameless from this disaster. Union ----- Department of the Rappahannock (McDowell) ***************************************** Formulated the initial Union strategic plan. After this, his role was minimal, which was as per expectations. Kept sending messages to his fellow players demanding they push their forces harder, attack more, and other general encouragement stuff. This was not always well received. McDowell deserves praise for that, despite occasional frustrating moments, he never tried to mastermind tactical moves from afar. Interestingly though, he tried to stop the Union operations immediately after the Confederate escape from New Market, feeling that splitting up the Union forces was too risky. Fremont, and even Shields and Ricketts, his own division commanders, ignored this order/request. Seeing the plan working much to his surprise, McDowell wisely shut up and played along and got ready to support the operations with King*s division. As several other Union players point out, he will get the greater part of the official credit for the game outcome - which could hardly be more favorable for the Union. To quote another player's evaluation: "McDowell is a national hero and has erased the memory of Bull Run from the nation's mind. A major power struggle is soon to take place between McDowell and McClellan that will last not only through the war but possibly in future presidential races." 2nd Division (Shields) ********************** Shields rushed to Fremont*s aid immediately, which spoiled Jackson's initial hope to stand their ground and reorganize where they started. Then pressed the retreating Valley Army as it slowly pulled back towards New Market. Officially designated as the "Hammer" (with Ricketts as the "Anvil"), Shields' men then had to carry out a series of head-on attacks against Jackson*s division, first at New Market, then in the New Market Gap. Not surprisingly, Shields' division suffered the most combat casualties on the Union side. Although frustrated at times, he never lost heart, and kept attacking - the reward was the game-clinching dislodgment of Jackson*s division from the New Market Gap at June 08 Noon. His persistence was key to the Union win. 4th Division (Ricketts) *********************** Carried out his first flanking operation successfully, pressing his men hard, even utilizing force-marching to get to New Market. Lost contact with his fellow Union forces briefly at a key moment, as Ewell*s division marched up. Seemingly alone against the entire Confederate army, Ricketts briefly panicked, and uncovered the New Market Gap in his efforts to prevent the Confederates from moving South. However, at this point he rose to the occasion and performed yet another flanking maneuver around the Confederates. Key to this was starting this march early, when it seemed that Jackson and Ewell would withdraw that way, but before they actually did so. This maneuver was even more successful than the first, as he managed to separate the Confederate force into two parts. Helped by very favorable weather (the Shenandoah swelled by rain just at the right time to help him keep the Confederate army split into two parts), he then held his positions against attacks from both parts of the Confederate force until Shields nailed Jackson. Finished the game off with a very neat tactical maneuver, which first eliminated the remnants of Jackson*s division, then closed the last avenues of escape and pretty much sealed the fate of Ewell*s division. Nominated by another Union player, I concur: Ricketts earns MVP on Union side. Mountain Department (Fremont) ***************************** Fremont*s cooperation with the other Union players was outstanding. Leaving the pomp and circumstance to McDowell, his quiet cooperation with the other Union Commanders was key to the Union success. There was simply no disunity on the Union side, despite somewhat harsh words from McDowell and Shields at times, criticizing Fremont*s poor movement rolls. Fremont ignored this and kept focused on the task at hand - there was no Union rivalry, a fact that Fremont deserves most of the credit for. Despite possibly overly severe tactical limitations imposed on his forces in the scenario, he made the best of it. His own tactical maneuvers with his brigades surprised the enemy. His maneuver through the Mountains North of New Market won the respect of his fellow Union commanders - all talk of Fremont*s slowness suddenly ceased - and this operation ultimately put him into a position to *bag* Ewell, which he did very effectively. Perhaps his instructions to Blenker were a bit unclear immediately following the Confederate to escape from New Market, but he quickly rectified this. The only *rookie* (played in no previous *PBEMTest* games) left at the end of proceedings, he is a very welcome addition to the PBEM roster. I am hopeful that *Fremont* will play in future games. Blenker*s Division (Blenker) **************************** Less than enthusiastic about his role assignment (the player commented: "I guess someone HAD to play Blenker..."), Blenker spent the first couple of turns trying (unsuccessfully) to convince the GM that there had to be some way his men could nullify the -1 combat penalty. This not working, he set about achieving as much as he could by maneuvering in the enemy flanks, and it was his appearance west of New Market that allowed Ricketts the freedom to perform his second flanking maneuver. Blenker then performed a long a semi-futile march south around the Massanutten Maintains, losing 25 percent of his force to straggling altogether. It is easy to ridicule Blenker*s maneuvers, and the Blenker himself indeed at one point declared that he was keeping copies of his original orders from Fremont just in case they would be needed *at the court martial*. Fremont, though, felt no reason to shed responsibility for Blenker*s moves: consider if the Confederates had pulled South immediately after escaping through the New Market Gap, rather than the fateful rest. This is what Lee wanted, and in this case Blenker*s position might have been extremely crucial. As it was, Confederate hopes of escape in the last few turns hinged on a retreat southwards - had they gotten out and past Ricketts. Blenker*s presence was further insurance of a Union win. 7. EXTRACTS FROM PLAYER COMMENTS ###################################################### - From Jackson ------------------------------- Well, I did my best, and lost. Tactical considerations: The difficulty in this scenario was that we could not really start a battle even when we had "numerical superiority". Assuming we had caught an isolated Union division, the rest of their army would have fallen upon us (with our being disorganized and fatigued) immediately, or very soon, since Union divisions were usually quite close to each other (within a day's march). Union troop movements were very rapid, all the more because they could always move full speed: no caution needed when you have such manpower superiority. Operational considerations: I made two controversial decisions: the first was to pause North of Mt. Jackson in order to reorganize our troops. The second was to stay so long in the mountain. Regarding the first decision, I still think that it was the better idea because otherwise we would have lost a lot of stragglers and we would have been unable to resist a combat. The game would have turned into a long rout. As a side note, it would also have been very boring for the Confederate players to maneuver a permanently disorganized/fatigued army. Also, I must say that I did not expect Ricketts to march so quickly: since Shield had gone to Strasburg instead of going to Luray, I expected to reach New Market before the Federals, particularly with the rain of the preceding day. Regarding the second decision, it was probably a mistake. My plan was to delay the Union forces long enough to allow Ewell to raid Front Royal. It was very risky, but almost successful: if we had won the first initiative die roll of June 6 PM, my division would have escaped to Luray, instead of Ricketts closing the pocket. With hindsight, I should have retreated across White House Bridge on June 6 Noon and defended there. I have no complaint about Ewell's tactical leadership. He made the right decision even in the most difficult situations (before I lost contact with him - then I don't know). --------------------------------------------- - From McDowell ------------------------------ June 8, 11:30 PM Near Milford Secretary Stanton, The rebel army that has operated of late in the Shenandoah Valley will cause you and the President no further concern. It no longer exists. The Department of the Rappahannock awaits new orders. (Signed) Major General Irvin McDowell, commanding Department of the Rappahannock - More From McDowell ------------------------- General Jackson, General Ewell, Don't feel too badly, we took some long-odds risks and were fortunate to have them pay off... your point about being unable to recover from disorganization and exhaustion is more important than you realize; in fact, it formed the cornerstone of our plan to have Ricketts cut you off at New Market... my greatest fear was that my commanders would allow you time and space to fully recover and I was constantly hounding them (to the point of annoyance) to force you to action... by the way, had Ewell tried to "raid" Front Royal, he would have run straight into King's entire division (20 SP)... I had to laugh about "Union troops were very rapid", they sure seemed slow enough to me sometimes! I sincerely hope we are able to meet again on the hexagonal field of battle. Best regards, McDowell - Even More From McDowell -------------------- Fellow Union Generals, Hey guys, GREAT game! I found all of your post game messages most interesting. Personally, I find it hard to find fault in the conduct of a campaign that results in the near total destruction of the enemy's army; so I won't even try. When you consider how difficult it is in GCACW to virtually eliminate your opponents' forces, then you realize the significance of our victory. It was all I could possibly have hoped for. There were a couple of points brought up in your messages which I feel compelled to comment upon. General Fremont was subject to the same kind of general directives from the War Department that I was, and should be highly complimented for cooperating with a plan of operations that was basically thrust upon him without benefit of (time-consuming) discussion. General Blenker was, of course, subject to Fremont's orders. General Shields' made a good point about rebel mistakes, and my response is that if we had not exploited them then they would not have been 'mistakes'. We made some errors in judgment also, but the enemy failed to take advantage of them and they became inconsequential. Obviously though, the opposing command did fail to recognize the tremendous danger of Ricketts' drive towards New Market. Shields made another point about switching which division would head for New Market, I can only say that I knew we would lose valuable time if the two divisions had to cross through each other, time we couldn't afford to lose. General Ricketts wondered about the overall plans 'from the top'; experience has taught me that one will achieve no more than planned for, so my plans were based upon trying to win a decisive victory. The simplest thing to try was to cut off the enemy as far north as possible, unite our forces, and then defeat the enemy in battle. Which is what we did. God, I love this game! Thanks again for your excellent cooperation and a most enjoyable game! Best regards, McDowell --------------------------------------------- - From Ricketts ----------------------------- Multiplayer blind games are very different from face-to-face games with full birds-eye view. This was obvious on a number of occasions. E.g., Jackson would never have stayed so long in the New Market Gap if he had known that Fremont and I were marching through the mountains to surround him. What could have saved Jackson was Ashby placed about the White House Bridge with PICKET orders. However, Jackson could not know that both Fremont and Ricketts had started marching to surround him on the turn where Shields made the attack that forever sealed the western end of the New Market Gap to the CSA. (...snip...) Another issue is how detailed the overall commander should be in his orders to his subordinate. McDowell did a fine job of telling WHAT he wanted done (destroy the enemy) and leaving much of the HOW to his subordinates. Related to this is the level of communication between the players. Telling where one is and what orders will be issued and why, that helps the other players in writing their orders next turn. I was much helped in the later part of the game by knowing in advance what Fremont would do on his next turn, as I could then guess that Ewell would be unable to concentrate on me. --------------------------------------------- - From Shields ------------------------------ I think the magnitude of our victory was more due to the rebels' mistakes gather our own good plans. I do not understand why Jackson stayed so long in the Gap. He would have done must better if he had started marching south, Exh/Disorg or not. Also, in his march from Strasburg, he should have made more haste. The way I read the rules, the CSA had +1 MP on us for every march. That should allow them to give the Federals the slip in nearly every chase. In my opinion, Jackson and Ewell should have been able to reach the New Market Gap two to three turns before Fremont, Blenker, and I. Especially because we took our time in coordinating the chase. That would have given them time to push Ricketts away and escape the pocket. --------------------------------------------- - From Blenker ------------------------------ There have been some comments besmirching my performance in the recently concluded Valley Campaign. I was following the orders as given to me directly by General Fremont - my superior officer, assumedly with General McDowell's blessings. What other generals wished me to do in the campaign is of no significance as I did not then, nor do I now, have to answer to them. I can provide the orders as written to show that my duty, as seen by General Fremont, was to initially ensure that the enemy did not escape into the mountain passes (thus ensuring that I and not they be the recipient of the red-dot shirt) and then to stay on the flank to ensure that the enemy did not escape Westwards into the mountains. At no time during the initial days of the campaign was it even insinuated by General Fremont that my troops were to take part in the initial attack on the rebel forces. I was to remain on the flank to keep the enemy from escaping in that direction. Only after General Fremont encountered Ewell's troops East of the Shenandoah River were positive orders received to engage the enemy. At that time we were already in the Massanutten Mountains attempting to get South of Jackson so he would not escape. The only logical course to take at that time was to get through the mountains (thus keeping the shirt) and come up the other side, which is what we did. It is only because the enemy did not move South at this point that we did not take part in the main battle. I hope that we would have taken part in the described follow-up battle with Ewell near Hamburg as we were headed in that direction, and in fact already had one brigade in striking range guarding Fremont's flank. On a related note, I believe that both Shields and Ricketts both deserve high marks in the campaign. The Shields player was obviously frustrated with my movements early on, but he did not know what orders I had from General Fremont. Ricketts blamed himself for letting Jackson get away, but at the time the rebels would have escaped through Harrisonburg anyway if he had guarded the Eastern rout. Ricketts just did not have enough troops to block all avenues of escape. Fremont acted boldly in his move after Jackson's first escape and probably fooled the enemy into thinking that he had close support behind him. I must admit that I was the 'least valuable player' on the Union side, (though we did get rid of the VA cav brigade) but both myself and my substitute player believe that given our orders and the circumstances that this is how the position should have been played. --------------------------------------------- - From Fremont ------------------------------ I have read some criticism and comments about Blenker's movements. First of all I would like to point out once and for all, that he has acted in accordance with my direct orders. I take full responsability for all aspects of his movements. This is not such a bad thing; since he has successfully accomplished the tasks I have given him. Personally, I think his movement was necessary. At the beginning, his maneuver deprived the rebels of the chance of 'disappearing' into the mountains. The mountain gaps are very easy to block, and allows Jackson to be out sight of our scouts. This could buy Jackson time to rest and then choose wherever he would appear next. Perhaps this order is not the most crucial one, but it was a possibility we COULD guard against. About the last part of the campaign, I think that the focus of the enemy was escape, or at least it should have been... I find it logical to assume that their route would be to the south. If they run to the north, they have more chances to encounter USA units. So I think it was a good option to close the southern path to the rebels. (...snip...) Blenker writes, "I must admit that I was the 'least valuable player' on the Union side"; I do not see it this way. In an army all people are important, and the unit that carries the supply is no less important than the first line unit. His presence allowed me and Ricketts to advance as freely as we did. I think that Blenker would have liked to participate in the battle. I can only say he that if the enemy had run to the west, initially, or south in the end, his forces would have been indispensable. This is not an excuse, it is merely my point-of-view. I hope it at least enables you to understand my orders. --------------------------------------------- --------------------------- ONElist Sponsor ---------------------------- ~ FREE Games & CA$H Prizes! ~ $55,000+ Awarded Monthly ~ Welcome to Gamesville.com-- Home of the World's Biggest & Best Free Games Play Three-Eyed Bingo, Quick-Draw Poker, Pop Quiz & Picturama FREE! Click Here ------------------------------------------------------------------------