The Game Review Richard Berg Wouldn't Dare to Publish! :-) The following review was drafted in 1980, soon after Game Designers Workshop came out with its new "Series 120" game, "1941: Operation Barbarossa." In its way, it is a neat design--at least as good as GDW's "Great Patriotic War" which followed it some yearslater. I don't know who has publishing rights--I heard somewhere that it had been re-published in a European wargame magazine--but it is worth consideration by someone, in that regard. I myself have four copies, I have just discovered. Tournament, anyone? :-) I offered the review to Richard Berg for his newsletter, but (to his credit, I guess) he was leery of charges of bias, if he let the designer of a competitive game--"Sturm nach Osten"--do the honors. Lou Coatney PANZEROGRE or The Creatures that Ate Ivan 1941: OPERATION BARBAROSSA John M. Astell, Designer 17"x23" mapsheet, 120 single-sided counters, 16-paged rules and tables booklet, one die, boxed, $5.98. [sigh!] Game Designers Workshop, Bloomington, IL 61701 [See end of review for capsule comments and assessments.] Reviewed by Louis R. Coatney A couple of years ago, I playtested my own Russian Front campaign game design--STURM NACH OSTEN ... I SHTURMY NA ZAPAD!--as a prospective "120" with Frank Chadwick, John Astell, and other members of the GDW crew. Because of format limitations and contract differences, GDW's publication of SNO never transpired. Afterwards, a discussion arose at GDW as to whether the 1941 game should be on the African or the Russian campaign. The decision to go with the Russia game was (rightly) made. Naturally, I became a little apprehensive about how much GDW might draw upon SNO. However, it appears that my worries were entirely unfounded and that 1941 is a distinctive interpretation of Great Patriotic War military operations unto itself. Physically, the game is up to GDW's typically high graphic standards. All components are attractive and functional, with the possible exception of the box itself. The Series 120 box size is smaller than a standard bookshelf size, and the extra-stiff mapsheet suffers many folds and a warping bend, in order to fit. A flat playing service is not readily possible when it issues from such a womb. Another thing about the 1941 box that I don't like is its art. Mr. Hentz's drawing is as cluttered, chopped, and ugly as was that of GDW's 1940. Crowded into the scene is a veritable museum of militaria and one rather grotesque character. But then, some consider war itself to be an ugly and grotesque business. The mapsheet is generally outstanding. Covering only Operation Barbarossa (Jun41-Mar42) in month-scale game-turns, the game's scope stops at the western borders of the Soviet Union. Canted similar to THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN's map--the North compass arrow seems to be about 30 degrees off - 1941's map covers as far north as Arkhangelsk, as fareast as Gorki, and as far south as Maikop. Southern Finland is included. The scale is 41mis/65 kms per hex--19 hexes from Warsaw to Moscow (vs. STALINGRAD's 21, THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN's 20, Sturm NachOsten's 18, and BARBAROSSA'S 15). Rivers are along hex-sides. There is some confusion at the mouth of the Dnepr (which should have been north of the isthmus in hex 3320). The rivers are conservatively drawn: e.g., the Dnepr stops at Smolensk and the Dvina at Vitebsk. This is good, in that the rivers are less significant obstacles themselves in their upper reaches, but it is sometimes bad in that there is often marsh and woods at the source of many of Russia's great rivers. For example, terrain is pretty thick at the source of the Dvina River in the Roslavl(2014) - Bryansk area. A river along 3220/3221 could have represented the tidal basins that enhance Odessa's defensibility. The Dvina Riverbend should have been at 1318(/Dvinsk), not around 1418. Major rail lines are mapped accurately, and John has made sense of the basic patterns of the seemingly chaotic Russian tracks. (The only significant omissions I see are the connection from Stalingrad to the Saratov-Astrakhan line and the Kalach spur which would give the Soviets their historical logistical base north of the Don River.) Swamp seems a little sparse around Tichvin and a little excessive north of Zhitomir. Considering their prohibitive movement and combat penalties, swamp hexes might have been more conservatively dispensed in this area. As to the cities, they are very selectively chosen and rated (major vs. "reference") with a few exceptions: the absence of Memel, Libau, Parnu, and some Black Sea ports as well, is puzzling in view of the importance of ports in the optional strategic sea movement rules. Brest and the significant mining and industrial cities of the Donbas (other than Stalino) are absent. Vilno seems one hex too south - or is Kovno/Kaunus one too north? In one or two instances coastline hex-sides seem ambiguous. Nonetheless, 1941's map far surpasses those of STALINGRAD, THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, and BARBAROSSA in detail and general design. 1941's victory conditions are strictly geographical and embodied by strategic city objectives. The relative victory assessment values of these seem generally valid but exclude such significant cities (and regions) as Stalingrad and Grozny. In view of the critical importance of the German *Panzergruppen* to Axis offensive operations, the loss of any of these units would have serious strategic consequences in the game's historical context, and the Russian player should be rewarded accordingly in the standard game as well as in the optional/extended game. 1941's units and their starting positions reflect the game'soverall emphasis on historical detail. For example, each and everyone of the 25 Soviet 1941 mechanized corps stationed in the westernSoviet Union is accounted for, although they are frequently paired in nonhistorical "group" units. A mechanized "group" like the "6/11" is defensible, since elements of these two corps were historically committed together in Nikitin's counterattack near Bialystok. Unfortunately, one or two "groups" have little or no historical basis. Why the 5. Mechanized Corps (which historically went into action alongside the depleted 7. Mech Corps near Orsha) was paired with the 16. MechCorps (which was attached to the 12. Army near Chernovtsy) is highly questionable. If one of the reasons for pairing thee Russian mechanized corps was economizing the game's number of pieces, the device was a mistake. Thanks to their stacking ability, the few *individual* Russian mechanized corps are even more important than the more powerful mechanized "groups." (The disproportionate importance of these minor units reminds me of STALINGRAD's three 2-3-6 armored corps units.) John has obviously gone to much effort to include as many of the Russian 1941 armies as possible and to enter them into the game at historically accurate times. However, considering the importance of the individual mechanized corps, most of the mechcorps should have been individually specified, instead, for the sake of the game's operational consistency. Since there is no shortage of Russian army 4- 3s during the game, some of these could have been omitted and compensated for with an increased replacement rate. Another feature of the Russian order of battle I don't like is the fact that - with the exception of three 8-3s, two 6-3s, and the four (understrength) 6-2 shock armies - all of the Russian armies are 4-3s. Considering the hasty formation and varying composition of these units, historically, their uniformity in the game would seem difficult to justify. Unfortunately, 1941's abbreviated "Series 120" format apparently did not permit the inclusion of game design commentary or bibliography to explain such design decisions. The Russian units, like the Axis units, begin the game in predetermined, historical locations (or in their appropriate months of appearance on the turn record track). The accurate locations and strengths of the Russian units are crucial in 1941, since the beginning Axis operations are essentially determined by them. The locations are basically correct, with only a few minor exceptions. For example, D.D. Lelyushenko's 21. Mech Corps was initially attached to the 22. Army stationed near Velikiye Luki. It went into action northeast of Dvinsk (1818) and was nowhere near Riga, where it is positioned in 1941's setup. The 22 Jun 41 composition of Soviet armies in the line - given in rifle and cavalry divisions, but minus their attached mech corps tank and motorized divisions, their fortification zone detachments, and any military district reserves - were: 7.(4), 23.(5-7), 8.(5), 11.(8),27.(4?), 3.(3), 10.(7), 4.(4), 13.(4?), 5.(5), 6.(4-6), 26.(3),12.(6), 18.(3?), and 9.(6?). (18. Army was officially formed after the invasion.) Soviet military historians have criticized the weakness of 3.Army, which was responsible for defending the northern flank of the Western Special Military District, facing Warsaw. 1941's strength allocations do not conform to many of the above dispositions. The omission of the Soviet cavalry and parachute corps is questionable if all the mech corps are being specified, considering their importance in the Battle of Moscow, 1941. The Axis order of battle is also intriguing. Most of the *Panzerkorps* are consolidated into four *Panzergruppen*. These are"monster" units in every sense of the world. They are immune to the risks of an "Exchange" combat result when attacking most Russian units, thanks to a rule which transforms an "Exchange" into a "D Elim" if the defender's combat strength is less than or equal to one-third of the smallest attacking unit's *printed* combat factor. When defending, they can retreat - as well as trace supply - through unoccupied enemy Zones of Control. Since isolation does not penalize units' defensive strengths, anyway, decent attacks against them are virtually impossible. (A 3:2 combat odds column is sorely missed in such a game system, as is a release of defender retreat requirement option for the attacker.) The 46. *Panzerkorps* - which should have been incorporated into the starting strength of Guderian's 2.*Panzergruppe* - and the 40. *Panzerkorps* can be combined into an adhoc *Panzergruppe*, but they lack this special, crucial invulnerability to an "Exchange." Considering the extra exchange possibility at 3:1 odds, such a drastic degree of invulnerability is not justified by a mere administrative relationship and is not realistic. As enjoyable as is conning these juggernaut armored units around the battlefield, trampling everything in their path, I think they are a conceptual mistake. The sparse and weather-sensitive road net of European Russia could not sustain radical movements by such concentrated quantities of tracked and (especially) wheeled vehicles. Since infantry-type units are less dependent on roads and since they received relatively greater benefit from the heavy equipment in (slow- moving) army support elements, I think that the army-level units (used to sop up some of the many Axis corps units) should have been the 8 German (infantry) field armies. The final bludgeoning thrust by von Kluge's 4. Army at Moscow in Nov/Dec41 was just one example of a field army asserting its individually potent identity. Other powers enjoyed by the *Panzergruppen* are common to all Axis and Russian armor units. Armor units may advance directly from one Enemy ZOC to another EZOC (as long as neither EZOC is that of an enemy armor unit) at a cost of 2 additional movement points. (German armor units' movement factors are, coincidentally, 6; while the Soviet armor units' movement factors are only 5.) Thus, armor units are critically important to defensive dispositions as well as to offensive operations. I dispute the ability of an armor unit crossing a river to freely pass through the ZOCs of an infantry unit without having to fight its way across. Yet another advantage to armor units is the rule stating that an attack composed *solely* of armor units against only infantry-type units receives a one-column bonus shift in the combat odds - presumably for unfettered speed and shock. My first game of 1941 (with and against "grognards" Tom Lee and Jerry Corcoran of Minneapolis) I entered in its second turn and was given the southern half of the Axis front, where the 1. *Panzergruppe* had been somehow backed into the Pripet Marsh and hemmed in by Russian units on four sides. On my turn's first phase, I selected a weak Russian mechanized "group" as the axis of my breakout. (Attacks are entirely voluntary.) Thanks to a couple of column shifting air points, I easily overran the mech group even at half/unsupplied attack strength, and proceeded to run amuck. One nice thing about the *Panzergruppe* unit is that you don't have to manually wrestle with a towering "killer stack" of armor units, like you do in STALINGRAD or THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN. Regardless of the historicity question, 1941's "Panzerogres" make for an exceptionally intense and free-wheeling game. The airpower rules in the game are appropriate and versatile, but occasionally irritating or irrational. An air point can do five things: cancel out an opponent's air point/mission, reduce his railt ransport capacity, provide offensive or defensive close air support, air-supply a cutoff unit for an entire game-turn, or - if an Axis airpoint in cahoots with two others - automatically eliminate Soviet seapower in the Baltic or Black Sea. Unfortunately, the 120-unit counter ration prevents the inclusion of badly needed air point markers to keep track of their deployment and expenditure during the lengthy, four-phased game-turns. There should also be some sort of reasonable range restriction on their use - especially in the interdiction of rail movement. Finally, the annihilation of the Black Sea Fleet should be much less certain than that of the Baltic Sea Fleet which was confined to harbor. Stacking is a little strange. The Russians can stack two units per hex, one of which may be an army or group. The Axis may stack one army or one *Panzergruppe* or two corps per hex. For German infantry,this seems a little thin. 1941's standard player-turn sequence of 2 complete cycles of full movement and combat reminds me of SPI's old classic, BATTLE OF THE MARNE. This enables Russian as well as Axis units to advance, attack, and then in the following phase scurry back to the most defensible positions possible, without risk of any well-deserved counterattack. Terrain-induced movement penalties for armor and infantry units are differentiated and quite severe. The 2. *Panzergruppe*'s lightning historical thrust - minus the 47. *Panzerkorps* which detoured north to assist the closing of the Bialystok-Minsk Pocket - toward the Dnepr River (along the road through the swamps south of Minsk) seems impossible to duplicate. Logically, rail transport is limited in unit capacity but unlimited in distance. There are detailed optional provisions for sea movement which I alluded to, above. Defensive terrain advantages are extreme for units defending behind rivers or against armor in swamps - attack factors are halved - but comparatively mild for the rough/mountain terrain and forests. Only the cities in red fortification hexes - Kronshtadt, Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, and Sevastopol--receive a defensive combat (and stacking! ?!) bonus, and that is comparatively drastic. Oddly, Stalingrad is unfortified, while Brest-Litovsk does not appear on th emap even as a reference city. The Combat Results Table (CRT) is the standard retreat/elimination model. Other than the lack of a 3:2 odds column and a dramatic difference between the 2:1 and 3:1 results possibilities, the CRT is satisfactory. The supply rules for 1941 also have unique features. For example, an unsupplied unit is not isolated and eliminated if it can trace a 5-hex path through EZOCs to a supplied, friendly unit. A powerful unit in a strong position can survive indefinitely in this state of suspended isolation, I have found. Supply is also heavily dependent on rail lines, with only a 3-hex operational supply radius from a railhead supply source allowed. As to the operational character of the game, I can say that it is very simple and playable in mechanics. However, placement of armor units is a crucial part of the game, requiring considerable time and thought. As the Russian player in my principal playtest game, I lost the entirety of the Western Ukraine and most of its defenders merely because I had left one of my minor mechanized units 1 hex out of position. Such unforgiving mechanics require meticulous play and discourage rapid and instinctive maneuver. Although 1941 does provide the chaotic dash of its historical campaign, the double-phase freedom of the game system allowed my Russian forces a degree of operational and tactical speed and versatility which is quite UNhistorical -and which my playtest opponent, fellow Alaskan Hans Hazelton, decried with great bitterness. Indeed, the 3-5/8-3 Russian "fortress stacks" can stifle any German offensive in the queenlike manner of oldS TALINGRAD's 7-10-4s. Although advertized as a two-hour - that's a "120" in minutes, of course - game, the double-length turns and meticulous play required make this tournament length ideal impossible. Hans and I went 5 (out of 7) turns with the utmost concentration in 5 hours. (He conceded at that point.) Moreover, timed and hurried moves would ruin the game, especially for tournament play. One other important factor in the game's length is the high number and turnover of units for the Russian player (which is quite historical, of course). In addition to his 39 starting units, the Russian player receives 29 reinforcement units and 25 replacement units (for a total of 93) - even if he doesn't continue the game into its three-month Jan-Mar42 Soviet Winter Offensive extension. My winning strategy as the Russian in 1941 was to continually attack and bleed away the German infantry at whatever combat odds. By the end of the fifth turn, Hans was having to use his *Panzergruppe* monster units to anchor his thinning defenses. Overall, I consider 1941 to be superior to STALINGRAD, BARBAROSSA, and THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN in the historical flow of its Jun41-Dec41/Mar42 period, and it is as good as any of them in playably simulating the operational character of the campaign. Moreover, its *Panzergruppe* monster units provide a highly stimulating gaming experience. I commend John Astell on his unique and entertaining game design about the largest and most crucial military campaign in modern history, and I would welcome his retaliatory critique of my own game on the subject when it is (re-)published in THE WARGAMER (no. 19)later this year. CAPSULE COMMENTS Physical quality: Very professional. Game's components are clear, attractive, and highly functional. Actual size, scale, and detail of mapsheet equals most full-size games. Playability: High. Standard operational/strategic level game mechanics with a few interesting variations produces a very playable but many-faceted game system. Playing time: Unexpectedly lengthy. As much as 5 hours for 7 turns for reflective players. 3-month/turn optional extension lengthens game proportionately. Double-length player-turns doubles game-time. Historicity: Satisfactory. Historical conditions and forces are fully replicated at a general level. Comparisons: More playable and historical than most comparable games. Overall: A very intriguing and worthwhile addition to the roster of Great Patriotic War/World War II Russian Front games. Copyright 1996 Louis R. Coatney