From: Kerry Anderson Subject: Ypres: 1915 -- Historical Notes I said earlier that I would post the historical notes to YPRES: 1915, so I am. Afterwords, I shut up for a while... The Second Battle of Ypres has been described as the battle when First World War truly began. Up until that time, it had been a war of maneuver and positioning, of hope and optimism that a quick victory was still achievable. Instead, this battle ushered in total war with trench warfare and the use of weapons of horror. The German's choice to use gas was an experimental one. Though actually used a few times in prior events, most attempts were feeble and not even noticed by the enemy. General Von Falkenhayn, the German commander-in-chief, decided to test the weapon on a larger scale on the field in Flanders. Still, the general staff had little faith in the weapon and did not dedicate any reserves for any possible breakthrough. Asphyxiating gas was specifically forbidden under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1906 and most of the Allied staff did not give these warnings much attention. On one instance a fortnight prior to the attack, a German deserter gave detailed information on this new weapon and its planned employment. He even showed interrogators the crude cloth mask to be used by German soldiers. While the commander of the French 11th Division was gravely impressed by this, the staff of British units that later took over their position gave this story and other warnings no credence. Late on a spring afternoon, British and Canadian soldiers began to notice a greenish appearance to the setting sun. It was 5:00 PM, April 22 and the Germans had unleashed a chlorine gas cloud along the Northern third of the salient. Facing this attack were a French colonial and territorial divisions — both second class units that immediately broke, fleeing to rear areas. British troops were confused by this migration, unable to understand the foreigners, but one message was clear by the way they grasped their throats crying "Gaz!" The collapse of the French front left a hole four miles wide. The Germans came through the gap, advanced three miles into the salient and halted. There were no provisions for a success of this scale and German troop, fearful of the effects of their own weapon, were content to follow their orders to the letter. With no reserves to fully exploit the gap, the potential for a significant German breakthrough was lost in a matter of hours. With the oncoming darkness, the Germans had no idea of what was in front of them. British and Canadian reserves rapidly attempted to fill the gap but often were no more than pockets of disorganized resistance. Several immediate counterattacks were launched but these were feeble and unorganized. The Allied left was raw and fully exposed. Over the next 24 hours, Allied reinforcements came trickling in. Distracted by British counterattacks, the Germans still had not realize the scope of their success. On the next day, the Germans began the attack again. The Belgians, reinforced by their 1st Division, thwarted the first blow as the German attempted to establish a bridgehead on the other side of the Yser Canal. Next, the Germans launched a second gas cloud against the Canadian 1st Division holding the Northeast corner of the salient around St. Julien. The Canadian division was a new unit, fresh from the colonies; yet, on this battlefield the Canadians were to show their worth. Ill-equipped to deal with gas, soldiers began to use drenched handkerchiefs, often soaked with the most readily available liquid -- urine. Surviving the gas, the Canadians suffered another twist of fate. Their weapons, the superbly accurate Ross rifle, showed one flaw: they jammed under rapid fire. While the Germans continued attack after attack against the determined defenders, the wounded fixed rifles. Unfortunately, these were the ones who suffered the worst effects of the gas, laying low in the trenches where the gas clouds pooled. The Canadians were pushed back from St. Julien and the defense began to falter. Repeated attempts to capture lost ground yielded little. With practically no participation from the French, Smith-Dorrien, commander of the troops engaged at Ypres, proposed a withdrawal to a perimeter around Ypres. General John French, who held a grudge against the Smith-Dorrien after losing face at the battle of Le Cateau, rejected this proposal and had him replaced by General Plumer. Ironically, Plumer's first instructions from French were for the withdrawal that Smith-Dorrien has proposed. The French General Foch argued vehemently against such a withdrawal. The days that followed were a series of bungled counterattacks that were tragic for those at the front. Finally on May 1, Foch admitted to Joffre that the lost ground could not be retaken. Immediately upon hearing this, Sir John French ordered the systematic withdrawal to a front three miles around Ypres. The battle continued spasmodically until its official end on May 24. The cost of the battle was high with nearly 60,000 British casualties -- mostly due to pigheadedness and clashes of ego. The German casualties were half this, perhaps marking the only case in the war where the defender suffered more than the attacker. This battle may be obscure to most but it is well known to Canadians. The heroism of the Canadian soldiers was drilled home in high school history much the same way that Bunker Hill was in American schools and Waterloo in the British. John McCrae, a young Canadian surgeon wrote the poem In Flanders Fields, which stands as an icon of remembrance.