From: "Louis R. Coatney" Subject: SKY, SEA, AND *JUNGLE* (Guadalcanal) Historical Notes, Bibliography, Game Design, Commentary, etc. Alan, if you would like to put SS&J's historical notes up on Grognard, feel free to do so. I think having the game design commentary with --*after*--the history makes it more relevant, when these components are standing alone. CONSIM-L: Any comments, questions, or criticisms ... including on balance and tone ... are welcome ... particularly on my remarks about "Bull" Halsey in the historical notes and bibliography. WWII-L: 'Thought you might find the Historical Notes and Bibliography interesting. Any feedback would be appreciated, but please copy me back in case I get purged again ... if Joe (Barone) is still raw from my having had the gall in the past to question some of his moderating/editorial decisions. :-) Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu www.wiu.edu/users/mslrc/ (FREE "1st Alamein" simple/lunch-hour boardgame and cardstock model BUTLER class Destroyer Escort plan ... to print off and play/assemble) I. Dedication: SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE is dedicated as a token of remembrance and respect to: 1. Bob Coatney (USAAF), Homer Coatney (USN/CBs), Jack Burgett (USN/Subs), Bill Heerde (USMC), and all the other Allied sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen who served in the Asian-Pacific War against an evil Bushido empire, and to 2. the hope that the United Nations' Victory in the Pacific is remembered as a victory for the human rights and future of all Asian-Pacific peoples, including the Japanese. II. Introduction: SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE is a relatively fast and simple combined operations game about the first Allied offensive in the Pacific: the (re-)capture of Guadalcanal Island (in the Solomon Islands) from the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the second half of 1942. This was a bloody, traumatic battle of attrition in anti-human jungle conditions (like those already encountered on New Guinea) or in frighteningly fast and destructive naval clashes at sea. At many points, Allied forces brinked on another, demoralizing defeat ... until valor and determination -- and superbly trained reinforcements with excellent new equipment -- overcame the skill and savage ruthlessness of our Bushido enemy ... which we were compelled to match ... to survive and to win. Although the "morning," "afternoon," and "night-time" action segments may seem strange, considering that each turn represents 15 days, it should be remembered that there were only 2 major naval air battles and 5 major (night-time) surface gunfire battles in this span of 4.5 months of intense Allied vs. Japanese confrontation. Military and naval service are often described as unendingly monotonous, mundane routine, punctuated by brief, shattering moments of stark brutality and terror. SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE is intended to focus on the campaign's moments of decision and action. X. Historical Notes The Japanese people are a great and good people with a unique, fascinating culture. However, in the late 1930s, fascist militarism had taken control of Japan--a nationalist cult movement built upon the worship of Emperor Hirohito, describing itself as "Bushido"--and was on the march in China. Although claiming to be establishing a "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" and defending Asians against Euro-American colonialism, the Japanese warlords' "liberation" soon proved to be just as exploitative and brutal. (By contrast, America was in the process of granting and supporting Filipinos' independence.) Victories in China were balanced by a devastating defeat by mobile-doctrine Red Army forces under the command of future Red Army Marshal Georgi Zhukov, in a secret Japanese-Soviet war on the Mongolian border in the fall of 1939. (After this trauma, a nonaggression pact was signed which the Japanese were afraid of violating even when their Nazi Germany ally had the Soviets almost beaten in 1941-42.) As the power of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Army grew and the China war widened, so did the Japanese demand for raw materials, especially oil. However, the American people became deeply moved by the suffering of the Chinese people, graphically portrayed in magazines like LIFE, and recoiled against the racism and savagery they were thus witnessing--which included torture and execution of prisoners, wholesale massacre and rape, and ruthless subjugation. (Japanese militarists were easily the equal of Apache warriors, in savagery.) Responding, President Roosevelt imposed an oil embargo against Japan, denying it the fuel vital to its war machine. Unwilling to forfeit the potential gains of future military aggression and believing Americans to be weak-willed and soft--from Christianity and democracy, having seen the military draft passed in Congress by only 1 vote after bitter debate--the Japanese junta ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, to begin its war against the Western Allies in the Pacific. The December 7, 1941, "Day of Infamy" massacre was a brilliantly planned and treacherously executed aerial and submarine surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the middle of diplomatic peace negotiations: a "sneak attack." (The Japanese could have taken Hawaii right then, if they had planned to.) Although there had been political dissension and even street riots in America about our rearmament and involvement in the coming world war, Pearl Harbor united everyone in shock and outrage in a way President Roosevelt never could have. The 3,000 Pearl Harbor dead spread that grief and anger throughout the land. (See what Harrison Ford's "Jack Ryan" has to say about the motiving power of rage, in the movie "Patriot Games.") Some of the anger became cultural and racist--in human reaction to the Japanese treachery and viciousness. However, on our West Coast, American citizens of Japanese ancestry were forced into prison camps as unjustly and unconstitutionally as President Jackson had force-marched our eastern Indians to Oklahoma. (Later, the 442nd Infantry Regiment of Japanese- Americans became the most decorated American unit of the war. Recently, our government finally apologized to Japanese-Americans and offered token compensation.) However, our leadership generation of World War I Americans never lost sight of the "four freedoms" we were fighting for, and that we were fighting for the liberation of Axis peoples, as well. (For example, Secretary of War Stimson--a tough-minded Presbyterian--intervened to make sure that Japan's spiritual/cultural capital, Kyoto, was removed from the atom bomb targets list, late in the war.) For six months after Pearl Harbor--as U.S.-educated IJN commander-in -chief Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had predicted--Japan sailed, invaded, slaughtered, and conquered for itself a vast sphere of the Pacific. Only in May 1942 was the Imperial juggernaut slowed, in the first-ever aircraft carrier battle in the Coral Sea. Then, on June 4, 1942, the United States Navy surprised and annihilated most of Japan's principal offensive weapon, the IJN's carrier Striking Force ("Kido Butai"). The desperate Battle of Midway (Island) was decided by Americans' "Magic"/ULTRA code-breaking, skill, and suicidal courage. Although Midway tripped up the Japanese onslaught and psychological momentum, extension of Imperial airbases down into the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific (threatening American life lines to Australia and New Zealand) finally forced a major, strategic Allied countermove. The MARINES Land on Guadalcanal Thus it was that the United States' 1st Marine Division, commanded by Marine Major General A.A. Vandegrift, came to be landed on Guadalcanal Island--codenamed "Cactus"-- on August 7th, 1942, by the early nucleus of what was to become a gigantic amphibious warfare machine under the brilliant, irritating Rear Admiral R.K. Turner. Unloading of supplies was inexperienced and slow, while the Marines chased off after fugitive Japanese, inland. Long-range Japanese aircraft from Lae (on New Guinea's north shore) and the new Imperial fortress of Rabaul--built in the shadow of a volcano that had erupted as recently as 1937, killing 500 natives--soon began attacking the American transports and warships in the waters north of Guadalcanal which was soon to become immortalized known as "Ironbottom Sound." However, 36 of the 44 attackers were shot down, thanks to the early, accurate warnings given by Australian "coastwatchers:" officials and adventurers on the jungle-covered Solomons, hiding out and spotting usually with the native islanders' assistance. (Indeed, Geoffrey, Linda, and baby Gordon Henry Kuper were native.) These quiet heroes also helped chart unknown areas and rescue hundreds of downed airmen and marooned sailors. The Battle of Savo (Island) The commander of the IJN's 8th Fleet in Rabaul, Admiral Mikawa, brought his old cruisers and destroyers down the "Slot"--as the straits down the center of the Solomons became known--on the night of Aug. 8/9, 1942, and managed to surprise the Allied warships guarding our transports. Although the IJN ships had been discovered by Allied reconnaissance, the warnings did not get through to our naval commanders, and that night Mikawa's veteran flotilla sank four powerful Allied heavy cruisers: USS ASTORIA, QUINCY, and VINCENNES and HMAS CANBERRA. (The old heavy cruiser KAKO would in turn be sunk by the old USN sub S-44, the following afternoon. Recently, a former CANBERRA crewman charged that CANBERRA was sunk by an American torpedo, unwisely launched by the executive officer of an American destroyer.) This disaster shattered the Allied assumption that although we might be caught by a surprise attack at anchor during peacetime or overwhelmed by unopposed aircraft at sea, we could hold our own in face-to-face ship vs. ship duels. The reasons were many: poor picketing and vigilance (in contrast to excellent Japanese night optics), poor damage control and preparations (epitomized by the wooden furniture and flammable fuels, paints, and waxes still on many American ships), and (although not realized at the time) vastly superior--in range, speed, 24"/60cm warhead size, and doctrines of use--Japanese torpedoes, which came to be known and feared as "The Long Lance." It got worse: during the night, Admiral Fletcher (the overall, naval commander) had fled the area with carriers ENTERPRISE, SARATOGA, and WASP, abandoning the transports and surviving warships--and also forfeiting any opportunity for revenge. And so, Admiral Turner angrily sailed the invasion fleet back to the principal American base, Espiritu Santo, leaving the Marines to try to supplement what few supplies had been unloaded with those the Japanese had left. Besides hunger, the Marines were soon suffering malaria and dengue fever. Battles and wars are often won only because one side makes fewer really stupid mistakes than the other. After the Battle of Savo, there was much criticism of Admiral Mikawa for not following up on his initial victory by going on to slaughter the transports, which would have ended the Allied operation, right there. However, the Japanese high command's initial reaction was unconcern--unaware that an entire division of U.S. Marines was on "the 'Canal." This allowed the time needed to finish its precious, strategic airfield--"Henderson Field,"named for a Marine air commander killed at Midway-- and to build up our land, sea, and air forces in and around the island. Eventually, the Japanese did land a regiment of elite Imperial Army infantry who attacked the Marine perimeter from the East on the night of Aug. 21/22, along the coast and across a shallow river, at night. The Marines slaughtered them and the myth of Japanese invincibility, in the misnamed Battle of the Tenaru River. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons At sea, Aug. 23-25, the hesitant Pearl Harbor attack commander, Admiral Nagumo, led Japanese carriers against our equally wary Admiral Fletcher. Fletcher won, as light carrier RYUJO was sunk and the Japanese beaten off from reinforcing their surviving troops on Guadalcanal. A lull followed, while both sides landed troops: the Allies during the day and the Japanese usually at night, using fast destroyers and cruisers--"The Tokyo Express," commanded by Rear Admiral Raizo "Tenacious" Tanaka--able to be back out of easy air attack range from Guadalcanal's "Cactus Air Force" by daylight. In the middle of September, after various American forays, the Japanese attacked on land. The night-time Sep. 12/13 Battle of Bloody Ridge was vicious, hand-to- hand combat which our Marines won with concentrated artillery and machine gun fire, and finally knives, shovels, and bare hands. Gunnery Sergeant "Manila John" Basilone became the first Marine to win the Medal of Honor in World War II, for his efficient and fearless personal direction of his machine gun platoon (which he had bartered and hoarded to unauthorized double-strength, incidentally.) As usually happened, far more Japanese died than Americans--often in suicidal attacks. Offshore, things were going badly. SARATOGA and new battleship NORTH CAROLINA were severely damaged, and WASP sunk, by IJN submarines stalking the U.S. Navy's patrol area southeast of Guadalcanal--soon known as "Torpedo Junction." On Sept. 30, America's Pacific naval commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz, flew into Guadalcanal to award decorations and inspect conditions for himself, as did most senior American commanders. The Battle of Cape Esperance Then, on the night of Oct. 11/12 outside Ironbottom Bay to the northwest of Savo Island, Rear Admiral Norman Scott made the first intelligent tactical use of radar, when he surprised a Japanese cruiser force intending to bombard Henderson Field. Old heavy cruiser FURUTAKA and fleet destroyer FUBUKI were sunk in trade for the sinking of destroyer DUNCAN and near-blowup of light cruiser BOISE. In the confusion, three Japanese cruisers were claimed sunk. Believing control of the sea won, American transports landed a National Guard infantry regiment equipped with the new M-1 Garand semiautomatic rifle and large amounts of supply. "The Bombardment" However, on Oct. 13, Henderson Field was devastated by a shrewdly timed bombing raid, and longrange Japanese artillery--"Pistol Pete"-- began regularly shelling the field. Infinitely worse, that night, was "The Bombardment." Using special high explosive 14" shells, battle cruisers KONGO and HARUNA utterly smashed the American positions, knocking out most offensive/bombing aircraft. General Vandegrift warned the American high command that unless adequate support was given to the Guadalcanal campaign--which was becoming known as "Operation Shoestring," because of its low priority relative to the forthcoming landings in North Africa--we would suffer a disastrous defeat. Even President Roosevelt then intervened with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on behalf of the beleagured Marines, soldiers, and airmen. One key change was the Oct. 18 arrival in the area of Admiral William F. Halsey, to take direct command of the campaign. Epitomized by his slogan "Kill Japs! Kill Japs! KILL MORE JAPS!," Halsey's aggressivness renewed hope and morale. He was there in time for the next big Japanese push on land, Oct. 23-26. In just one episode which may help understanding the regressed, dehumanized savagery of Pacific jungle-fighting, a young Marine was severely slashed across the back by the glancing blow of a Japanese officer's samurai sword. The kid rounded on his assailant, lunged directly and unexpectedly for the officer's throat, and killed him horribly by ripping out his windpipe with his bare hand. Democratic/humanitarian people were proving to be even more ferocious and efficent in killing than people from militaristic societies--when cornered and forced to be. The Battle of Santa Cruz With typically uncircumspect pugnacity, Halsey ordered Rear Admiral Kinkaid to "ATTACK! REPEAT, ATTACK!!" with his carriers, and the Oct. 25-26 carrier Battle of Santa Cruz. The result was a tactical Japanese victory, with carrier HORNET sunk and ENTERPRISE so badly damaged that it was said even "Bull" Halsey wouldn't dare to push her forward elevator's "Down" button, for fear it might not re-elevate. However, in part thanks to the new American adaptation of the Bofors 40mm antiaircraft, an irreplaceable core of veteran Japanese naval aviators was killed. Thus, in early November, heavily escorted American transports brought more supplies and ammunition to our troops on Guadalcanal. The First Battle of Guadalcanal Both sides now turned to gunpower, and on the night of Nov. 12/13 a hastily formed American task force of cruisers and destroyers took on battle cruisers HIEI and KIRISHIMA, coming down the Slot to inflict another 14" bombardment and escorted by a dozen Japanese destroyers. Although the Japanese were detected by radar, Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan inexplicably allowed the single-file American column to run headon into the Japanese. The result was a wild, bloody, confused, and top-speed Irish brawl at such short ranges that torpedoes could not arm and explode. Callaghan and the skilled, experienced Scott--a mere spectator aboard light/antiaircraft cruiser ATLANTA--were both killed. Destroyers BARTON, CUSHING, LAFFEY, and MONSSEN were sunk. ATLANTA--which was shelled by American as well as Japanese ships and il-designed for gun duels, anyway--was soon mortally damaged and derelict, to be scuttled the following day. (Crippled sistership JUNEAU would blow up when submarine-torpedoed the next day--all five Sullivan brothers from Waterloo, Iowa, dying with her. Only 10 of her 750-man crew survived.) Heavy cruisers PORTLAND and SAN FRANSCISCO were also heavily damaged. However, with HIEI critically damaged (to be sunk by Marine bombers next morning) and two destroyers sunk, the Japanese turned and fled the ferocity of the American attack. Like the slashed young Marine's reaction, Callaghan's controversial headon "lunge"--intentional or not --avoided a longrange devastation of his ships by salvoes of Long Lance torpedoes and 14" naval shells, closely engaged and disrupted the Japanese, and fulfilled his mission of protecting the Marines, soldiers and airmen on Guadalcanal at all costs. The next night, Nov. 13/14, unopposed Japanese heavy cruisers bombarded Henderson Field, but were set upon and mangled by the Guadalcanal's "Cactus Air Force," retreating back up the Slot, the following morning. However, Japanese transports were known to be en route, with little to oppose them. In Washington, the tension was as high as it would be on D-Day (June 6, 1944). Finally, when it was learned that KIRISHIMA would be returning to attempt another 14" bombardment, Admiral Halsey gambled everything and sent in Admiral Willis Augustus "Ching" Lee (with new battleships SOUTH DAKOTA and WASHINGTON) to stop that, again at all costs. The Second Battle of Guadalcanal The resulting Nov. 14/15 night battle began disastrously, with 3 out of the 4 escorting American destroyers being sunk by Long Lances. SOUTH DAKOTA waded in and took on the entire Japanese task force (which also included first-line heavy cruisers ATAGO and TAKAO and 11 light cruisers and destroyers). SOUTH DAKOTA was smothered with gunfire--dozens of Long Lances missing, miraculously--her electricial power was knocked out, and her guns fell silent. A crushing Japanese victory looked assured, when finally WASHINGTON opened fire, swiftly smashing KIRISHIMA under with one-ton projectiles, single-handedly putting her escorts to flight, and incidentally saving SOUTH DAKOTA. The Battle of Tassafaronga The following day, Army and Marine aircraft rose like hornets from Henderson Field, to slaughter the oncoming Japanese transports and their thousands of troops. Thereafter, the Japanese went on the defensive. On the night of Nov. 30 in what became known as The Battle of Tassafaronga, a "Tokyo Express" resupply task force of destroyers commanded by "Tenacious Tanaka" was cornered by an American cruiser force. The result was American cruiser NORTHAMPTON sunk and NEW ORLEANS, MINNEAPOLIS, and PENSACOLA heavily damaged for only new destroyer TAKANAMI sunk in return. (NEW ORLEANS had her bow blown off all the way back to her second main battery turret! Damage control had greatly improved.) Allied Victory Thereafter, Tokyo Expresses were treated with more respect, and after a big one on the night of February 7/8, 1943, American troops advanced on the last Japanese base, on Guadalcanal's western shore ... only to find it deserted! The Express's last runs had been *evacuations*, brilliantly performed by Tanaka. However, of the 50,000 Japanese troops sent to Guadalcanal, only 13,000 starved, sick, exhausted survivors returned. Overall, naval losses had been remarkably equal in numbers of ships and total tonnage lost: two Japanese battle cruisers sunk for two American aircraft carriers, for example. However, hundreds of new American ships and thousands of aircraft were on the way and, as American naval aviator Rear Admiral John McCain had predicted, Guadalcanal had been a "sinkhole" devouring Japanese airpower. The Allies had won the Solomon Islands battle of attrition, and we would press on through the Pacific to return to and liberate the Philippines (in October 1944). From there, it was on to Japan and final United Nations victory over Japanese fascism, with the decisive help of the atom bombs' overawing power and Emperor Hirohito's unprecedented direct intervention in affairs of state and his own courageous insistence on accepting unconditional surrender (2Sep45), for peace. XI. Bibliography Adams, Bruce. Rust in peace: South Pacific battlegrounds revisited. Sydney: Antipodean, 1975. Ballard, Robert D. The lost ships of Guadalcanal. NY: Warner, 1993. This is an outstanding written and graphic depiction of Ballard's deep sea visit to the sunken ships of Ironbottom Sound. The interviews with Allied and Japanese veterans, including a former CANBERRA crewman, are moving. Bergerud, Eric M. Touched with fire: the land war in the South Pacific. NY: Viking, 1996. Eric has pointed out how devastating even just destroyer shore bombardments could be, if they hit supply dumps! ... as AARON WARD and LARDNER did, just before the final, climactic land battle. Coggins, Jack. The campaign for Guadalcanal: a battle that made history. Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1972. This is probably the best all-round presentation of the campaign, especially for student-age readers. Coggins was an illustrator and war correspondent, and he provides clear, graphic explanations of equipment design and tactics, as well as maps, etc. Coggins was, in his way, a genius. Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cale. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1948-58. Frank, Richard. Guadalcanal. NY: Random House, 1990. This is now considered by many to be the definitive book of the campaign. Hammell, Eric. Guadalcanal: the carrier battles. NY: Crown, 1987 ____________. Guadalcanal: decision at sea. NY: Crown, 1988. ____________. Guadalcanal: starvation island. NY: Crown, 1987. Eric's comprehensive Guadalcanal trilogy is gripping reading. Hara, Tameichi. Japanese destroyer captain. New York: Ballantine, 1961. Hara was a talented and outspoken destroyer captain in the Solomons battles. His description of the use of the Japanese "Long Lance" super-torpedo explains much of the reason for early Japanese night battle success. Karig, Walter. Battle report. V. 3, Pacific war: middle phase. Washington, DC: Council on Books in Wartime, 1944-52. This is an excellent contemporary battle narrative with well-chosen photographs depicting the ships and other equipment and conditions of Guadalcanal. Kurzman, Dan. Left to die: the tragedy of the USS JUNEAU. New York: Pocket, 1994. Although Admiral Halsey dismissed HELENA's skillful and popular Captain Hoover for the abandonment of the JUNEAU survivors, the monitoring and rescue of sinking victims from sub-infested waters was no less the theater commander's--his--responsibility. Lofton, Bruce. The shame of Savo: anatomy of a naval disaster. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute, 1994. An Australian alleges with passion and charts that his ship, heavy cruiser HMAS CANBERRA, was accidentally torpedoed by an American destroyer. He also recounts his crew's condemnatory, painful welcome home received from an Australian admiral. Lord, Walter. Lonely vigil: coastwatchers of the Solomons. New York: Viking, 1977. This is an excellent account of how fundamental Australian coastwatchers were to Allied victory. Lundstrom, John. The first team and the Guadalcanal campaign: naval fighter combat from August to November, 1942. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. John's "first team" books are the best narratives and analyses available of naval air combat operations and tactics in the Pacific War. Miller, Thomas G., Jr. The Cactus Air Force. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States naval operations in World War II. V. 5, The struggle for Guadalcanal, Aug42-Feb43. Boston MA: Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1947-62. Morison is still the standard naval history. Considering the complexity of the events, he and his team made excellent sense out of them so soon after the war. Sakai, Saburo. Samurai! New York: Dutton, 1957. As the leading surviving Japanese ace, Sakai writes with authority about air combat in the South Pacific. He was grievously wounded at Guadalcanal. Shaw, Henry I. First offensive: the Marine campaign for Guadalcanal. Washington DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1992. Tregaskis, Richard. Guadalcanal diary. New York: Random, 1943. This wartime account of Guadalcanal was written with an immediate sense of the suffering and horror of Guadalcanal. IX. Designer's Notes on the Design of the Game: When SPI came out with SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN, I ordered it with great anticipation, but SC proved to be disappointing, because of its unnecessary pre-move plotting on a large, abstract hex-grid and its unimaginative reliance on factors and combat odds, even when it tried to consolidate cruisers and destroyers into "historical" divisions (albeit, the destroyer units were said to represent 5 ships instead of the actual 4 ... probably because of SC's already crowded piece roster. The Avalon Hill Game Company's VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC correctly solved the problem of geographically quantifying the Pacific campaign into sea areas bounded/garrisoned by continent and island masses, however its ship roster was "top heavy" and all of the WAR AT SEA system's dice-throwing slowed things down considerably ... and unnecessarily ... in the Pacific. Furthermore, it lacks a basic local detail of the Guadalcanal campaign: "The Slot" (the strait inside and up the Solomon Islands). I first drafted SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE back in Alaska, calling it "Guadalcanal Gazoo." That sobriquet evoked an image of simple play, like that of a kazoo. I had a number of good games with friends, but the rules were always in my head and the pieces borrowed from other game drafts of mine which necessitated a refinding and resorting for each different game system. It is one thing to be a designer/creator/artist ... and a game umpire in an almost "free Kriegspiel"/unwritten game system ... but finally having to follow through with intelligible, printed rules and graphics requires a lawyer's mind and has been anything but easy. Of course, what distinguishes SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE and makes it much more playable than most other operational/strategic naval games is its *factorless* anti-ship hit results table. While some may question that 2 cruisers or 4 destroyers or 1 battle cruiser can equal the firepower of a YAMATO or WASHINGTON, the differentiated survival (if not armor) rating accomodates all the essentals quite succinctly ... and surprisingly accurately. Players should remember that especially at close quarters, destroyers had torpedoes ... even in daylight ... which could mean death to a capital ship, unless it was properly escorted and able to stand off and do execution with its massive gun batteries. Even a single, valiant U.S. destroyer put mighty YAMATO to flight in the desperate Battle off Samar (Oct44). Basically, the more ships in a unit, the less of a chance it has to be sunk in any one round of combat, but the greater its likelihood of some damage in that round. Of course, within classes the weaker the ships, the more likely they are to be damaged ... or sunk. When I finally resolved to finish SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE this year, it escalated up to an "expansion draft" of the game with single-ship counters for cruisers, destroyers, and transports, as well as capital ships/ carriers. However, even with my streamlined combat system the game slowed and complexified drastically, let alone increasing the time required to mount/"assemble" the hundreds of ship pieces--as a kit or assembled copy (requiring *my* time)--and I returned to the "Gazoo's" original division format for cruisers, destroyers, transports, etc. Incidentally, the 1:12,000 scale of the ship outlines is the very same scale which is optimal for my "Naval Action" naval miniature rules, so maybe I can use all those individual ship icons for a miniatures alternative for ship combat resolution, as in the Avalon Hill Game Company's classic old game, JUTLAND. While the "sea area" approach may seem imprecise, SS&J is intended as a simple campaign, not tactical, game. There really were only three basic areas to deploy ships in this campaign: the Coral Sea, the Slot, or the South Pacific. For a time, the US Navy tried to keep its ships at sea south of Guadalcanal, but that attracted so many "snakes"--submarines-- that it became known as "Torpedo Junction," after the sinking of WASP. In SS&J, the South Pacific is "Torpedo Junction." The Strategic/Daylight Detection/Surprise table reflects the geographical relationship of home bases to the sea areas and inherent flying boat searches--PBY "Catalinas" for the Allies and Kawanishis for the Japanese. Thus, the Allies have some inherent detection advantage in the Coral Sea (because it is bounded on one side by the Australian continent) and in the Slot (thanks to the Australian "coastwatchers"). The reason for the "2X" wrinkle in the destroyer column for shore bombardment is explained in my annotation for Eric Bergerud's book, below. Troop/"X" units also represent supplies, incidentally. The one simple little rule I am especially proud of is the automatic row-shift up on the Anti-Ship table, if a target ship unit has Heavy Damage in daytime or just Damage at night. This is not only an "equalizer," showing how dangerous to large ships night-time close- quarters fighting (against torpedo-armed lesser classes) can be, it also replicates how damaged ships at night could be more readily identified and targetted. I might add that surface ships' torpedoes are not specified in the daytime, because of the problems long range caused torpedo use. Even the Japanese super-range Long Lances would often arrived in their target area only after their prey was long gone, as happened in the Battle of the Java Sea (Feb42), where the Japanese expended dozens of their expensive Long Lances, to sink only Dutch destroyer KORTENAER. Finally, I know the "Rabaul Volcano" rule may be resented and thought of as an unnecessary frill. However, even with a Karakatoa-class eruption's minute possibility, it adds a seismic element of insecurity to the Japanese player's perspective--the realization that no matter how well he plays, the game can always go up in smoke--which is realistic, I believe, and helps discourage nit-picking play. ... and it adds a laugh, now and then. VIII. Designer's Advice on Play of the Game: B. Play of the Game: Those who are successful early in a battle are advised to withdraw if they can. Sticking around for additional rounds often equalizes losses in the end. Even just damaging an enemy ship can knock it out for critical periods ... or the whole game. While task force ship composition is obviously important for antiaircraft and antisubmarine defense, it is also important for the type of offense desired. Thus, you might want to have a "big gun" task force in one instance or a "torpedo surprise" group in another. The Japanese player is strongly advised to save up his strength for one or two big pushes, rather than frittering it away in piecemeal attacks--in, for example, "shuttle attacks" from Truk. He should strike early, rather than later, in carrier battles. The Bofors 40mm AA guns can be devastating. Exceptions to this call for "rocks, not pebbles" are early "Night Only" Tokyo Express raids and resupplys down the Slot from Rabaul, especially on the first turn. Long Lances can attrit American gunpower, which the Allied player must risk to protect transports and prevent catastrophic shore bombardments. Selection of which 5 battleships (in addition to the 4 KONGO class battle cruisers) to use is also important. YAMATO and MUSASHI can withstand heavy punishment, except (especially at night) once they do get hit they can go down quickly and at tremendous victory point cost. For sure, they should be committed in sea areas which will end the turn under Japanese control. The Allied player is strongly advised to land as many troops on Guadalcanal as possible on the first turn. He can try for Bougainville, too, but troops there are vulnerable to short-range Japanese land-based airstrikes ... among other things. An antidote to a certain, devastating Japanese surprise torpedo attack in the Slot on the first "night," might be exactly the kind of mini-task-forces Admiral Crutchley had broken his ships into ... which can use up the two Japanese torpedo attacks and increase the odds of them losing surprise in one of the two?, three?, four? battles they are then required to survive to get to the transports. (So maybe I'm wrong.) "Magic"/ULTRA can be used to allocate forces to maximum effect in selective battle ... or to know when not to put to sea, meanwhile remembering that the Japanese do have the capability to naval-air raid Espiritu Santo from the South Pacific, like the American carriers could raid Rabaul ... if the Allied player wishes to be that foolhardy. Don't keep your carriers at sea unnecessarily, or they will soon get "snake-bit"--by submarines. On the other hand, watch out for raids on Espritu Santo. At least one B-17 should be allocated to "stage through" Port Moresby or Henderson Field to raid Rabaul's Simpson Harbor, if at all possible, if only to see what ships are there for use in the Slot or Coral Sea next turn and to knock out any transports or carriers with which the Japanese might be planning something outrageous. Other than the above, I really have no idea what to tell you. Despite its relatively simple mechanics, SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE's composition is very much an air, sea, and land game and how all these mediums and variables can be best orchestrated and coordinated is left to a far better game player than I. I do know I can lose to my son, Robert, playing either side. Most wargame players are "wannabe" designers (and everyone should do their own game), but it is seldom realized that most of us designers are just frustrated, wannabe winners. (THERE IS NO JUSTICE for game-playing designers. I am confident Frank Chadwick will back me on this, too.) Any feedback on the game's realism and balance will be most appreciated. Copyright 1997 Louis R. Coatney Lou Coatney 626 Western Ave. Macomb, IL 61455 USA 309-836-1447 (msg, but I cannot afford to return phone calls)