

1809 DESIGNER'S NOTES

By Kevin Zucker

The 1809 Campaign is known for its culminating battle of Wagram, one of the costliest victories of Napoleon up to that time. In addition to that victory was a defeat at Essling and one victory that slipped away. Both of the latter were firsts for Napoleon, and proved that he was no longer the unconquerable victor of Austerlitz. His Spanish campaign of 1808 had been inconclusive, and his very next campaign in Russia was way beyond his abilities. He was, in short, already tottering on the edge of a decline.

He did manage to win the 1809 campaign, but it took three months of negotiations afterwards to clinch the spoils. In addition, the near success of the Austrians raised hopes throughout Germany. For public opinion, this was a pivotal year of the turning against Napoleon, and it may be that no victory could have prevented that turning except one which led to a withdrawal of French troops quartered in Germany. Wagram was not a great victory, but it was better than Borodino, Luetzen and Dresden in that it did lead to a cessation of hostilities. Because of its fame, players will probably seek out the Wagram scenario in 1809, but I urge them to consider the Campaign scenario.

Administration in 1809

If the rules to the game could be compared to a machine, the Administrative Points (APs) would be the "governor," a small part which controls the activity of all the other parts. If compared to a living being, the APs would represent the heart. It is extremely important then that the levels of APs available to the players not be arbitrarily chosen, but based as closely as possible on the effects we see in history.

The Administrative Points perform two functions. First, their expenditure is required to order a force's movement. Second, having fewer accumulated APs results in higher March Attrition. If the Accumulated AP level is low, not only will forces be required to move under an Initiative die roll (the alternative to having an AP expended for their movement), but the marches they make will be shorter since attrition can be kept in bounds only by limiting march distances. This regulating effect is not a rigid limit; players will at times have to move without regard to attrition effects in order to bring the enemy to battle or complete a telling maneuver.

Players have the freedom to expend large amounts of APs to keep all their forces in motion, but after several turns of this, their APs will begin to run out and attrition will become a serious problem. At this point, a halt will have to be called so that APs can be accumulated. Here, the player who has hoarded APs will be able to hound an exhausted army, though it is likely that to some extent a player will be forced to match the level of APs expended by his more prolific opponent.

How, then, were the available levels of APs determined? Obviously there is nothing in the historical records we can refer to which is analogous to APs. They are not a static thing, like an army staff or a quantity of wagons, foodstuffs or money. They represent a dynamic — a question of how well all those components of the Administration were put to use. They are sort of an overall Army Effectiveness rating. The personality of the Commander-in-Chief would have a lot to do with this, but the contribution of his Chief of Staff would be equally important. Lack of resources would be a factor. Ultimately, it is much easier to determine the effects that these imaginary APs had in the actual campaign on attrition and tempo. For this purpose, we needed to determine the historical attrition, which required a complete idea of all the troops coming into the theatre.

Attrition in 1809

Including the reinforcements which appear on or before 5-6 May, the French Army begins the campaign with 189,000 men. Losses during the Abensberg-Eckmuehl phase were 10,000, plus the 3,000 men of the 65th Rgt. captured at Regensburg. There were then 176,000 with the army on the morning of 24th April (Table 1). At the battles of Neumarkt and Ebelsberg, 3,700 men were lost. That leaves 172,300 nominally still with the colors.

We know that on about the 16th of May, the French Army numbered 167,000 men in its infantry and cavalry formations. We can conclude, then, that March Attrition exceeded replacements by 5,300 men in the period up to the 16th of May. We know too that French replacements in the same period were 12,600, so that March Attrition should have been 17,900. Considering the rapid pace of operations, that is a rather low figure.

From 19th April to 16th May is fourteen game-turns. At the end of the period, the largest forces, those most susceptible to attrition, were Davout's with 18,000, Massena's with 26,000, and Oudinot's and Vandamme's with 12,000 each. (Lefebvre's corps was actually operating as three separate columns against the Tyrolese insurgents). Massena's units were down 7,000 from their initial strength of 33,000. If we assume that Massena's combat losses were equal to the replacements he received, his march attrition could be estimated as 7,000 men, or two-fifths of the army's total march attrition in the period.

Davout's force as composed on 19-20th April was also reduced by 7,000 men in the period. However, his III Corps took the brunt of the Austrian offensive at the outset of the campaign, so its combat losses were probably greater than the replacements received by about 2,000, making its total march attrition for the period 5,000 men. The remaining 5,900 men lost to march attrition were spread out among Oudinot, Vandamme and the other French leaders.

Knowing what levels of attrition are desired, it was simple to work backwards to the number of APs the French needed to begin the campaign. Massena's loss should be 1 SP when marching 5 movement points, on an average die roll of 3 or 4, after his strength falls to 30 or below. For Davout, who has a Bonus Point, attrition losses would average $\frac{1}{2}$ SP under the same conditions, assuming these long marches were made only in good weather. Massena would be able to make seven such marches in the fourteen game-turns of the period, and Davout ten, without likely exceeding historical attrition rates. To achieve these attrition rates, the French need to be on the "22-43 APs Accumulated" column on the Attrition Table. In order to allow the French to remain on this column throughout the period, and still move along at a historical clip, I put them near the high end, with 37 APs.

Our working figure for Attrition still lacks historical documentation; we need to proceed further into the campaign to check its accuracy (see again Table 1). Our figure for French losses at Aspern-Essling is 20,000. If this figure is combined with the previous combat loss figures, the total is 33,700; including casualties from the 65th Rgt., (captured) would make it 35,000. Of that total, the proportion of wounded can be estimated as 70%, or 24,500. The actual number of men in hospitals on the 1st June was 46,400 (from among the formations we are concerned with), which means approximately 22,000 were hospitalized due to non-combat attrition between the start of the campaign and the 1st of June. This is in line with our attrition figure of 17,900 up through 16th May.

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While the French were making their rapid march down the Danube, the main force of Austrians under Charles was hastening across the mountain pass at Cham and into Bohemia. They paused for one day at Budweis, and then recommenced their march on Vienna (see Table 2). In game terms, this march cost 29 APs and 36 Strength Points to Attrition, after adjusting the March Phasing to minimize attrition.

Following this 236-mile march, these five forces continued to lose an average of 760 men per corps per turn through May 19th. On the Attrition Table, this would require no more than four to six APs Accumulated, with marches of two or three MPs. And that is where the Aspern-Essling Scenario begins.

The Real Administration

This is how the AP levels were determined, but what factors are involved in the Army Administration, the actual stuff represented by the APs? There are two broad categories: General Staff, including troop movements and intelligence; and Support Services such as commissary, paymaster and medical. For the Administration to perform effectively, these elements would have to be in good working order.

Rating the General Staff

What is the basis for quantifying the efficiency of the army staff? A convenient measure is the amount of time it takes to deliver orders and communications. That is, what use does the staff make of its time?

Here we see Napoleon's best advantage. The time it took for an order of his to be drafted, delivered, executed, and reported back to him was done on a 24-hour schedule, while the Austrians rarely found their orders carried out in less than 24 hours.

Consider the following example from Petre's history: "Pire", despatched by Davout at 7 PM on the 21st, covered the 37 miles of dangerous, crowded road which separated him from the Emperor in 7 hours, and was shown into Napoleon's quarters at 2 AM." With the detours required on his way, his average speed was 5.3 m.p.h.

Davout had fought the Austrians until dusk, after 6 PM. Pire was an important field commander who was sent because Napoleon refused to heed Davout's written despatches. Davout had already sent no less than six reports to Napoleon through that day, but Pire's arrival half-hour report on the battle changed the entire picture, and every decision concerning the next 24-hour's operations was made between 2:30 and 4 AM — the last moment when marching orders for the dawn could be sent.

Of the seven orders drafted, one attached Wrede to Bessieres, one concerned defensive positions at Ingolstadt; and one to Bessieres described the other orders, since Napoleon felt confident with Bessieres' initiative.

One cannot find a lot of wasted time in the staff process, from Pire's hurried ride (commencing minutes after the battle's end) to the despatch of the next morning's orders — unless it be with Napoleon's stubbornness in sticking to his preconceptions. But by operating near peak efficiency, Napoleon and his staff were able to issue only four "movement commands."

On the same morning, the Austrian Archduke Charles issued his movement orders at 8 AM — four hours after Napoleon's — for an attack on Davout to commence between noon and 1 PM. With at least four hours' headstart, the 35,000 troops of Davout were able to escape a blow by 74,000 Austrians. The Austrian orders were changed to meet the French counter, but were issued so late that 32,000 men were unable to engage the French during the decisive battle that day. These Austrian orders were stymied due to quicker French staff-work. The Austrians were forced to react to a *fait accompli*, their own initiative was lost, and the successive waves of orders

TABLE 1: FRENCH ARMY STRENGTH LEDGER

As of 19 April	189,000
Losses at Abensberg-Eckmuehl	-10,000
65th Rgt. captured at Ratisbon	-3,000
As of 24 April	176,000
Losses at Neumarkt & Ebelsbg.	-3,700
As of early May	172,300
March attrition: 19 Apr. - 16 May	-17,900
Total replacements: 23 Apr. - 16 May	12,600
As of 16 May	167,000
Losses at Aspern-Essling	-20,000
As of 23 May	147,000
Reinforcements (Eugene's Army of Italy, Marmont's XI, Grenier & Grouchy)	37,000
Replacements: 21 May - 27 June	54,000
March attrition: 17 May - 1 July	-30,000
As of 4 July, 1809	208,000

TABLE 2

CHARLES'S MARCH FROM CHAM TO BUDWEIS: 28 APRIL - 5 MAY
Duration: 4 turns

Average March: 25 miles per turn on Primary Road

Phase Breakdown: 4 March Phases & 1 Reaction March

March Distance per Phase: 5 MPs.

Number of Forces: 5

Composition of Forces (Strength): I(28), II/IR(20/12), III(13), IV(15), Klenau (8).

APs Accumulated: 14-21

APs Expended: 12

Weather: Mud

Attrition Result: I(11), II/IR (inc. Chas. ★ 10), III (marched two turns longer, 4), IV(3), Klenau (2).

CHARLES' MARCH FROM BUDWEIS TO VIENNA: 7 - 15 MAY

Marches:

Budweis - Weitra (March 5, Reaction 2) - 8 May

Weitra - Zwettl (March 4) - 10 May

Zwettl - Neupoella (Extended March 9) - 11 May

Neupoella - Mold (Reaction 4) - 12 May

Mold - Wetzdorf (March 5) - 13 May

Wetzdorf - Goellersdf (March 5) - 15 May

APs Accumulated: 22-43

APs Expended: 17

Weather: Mud

Strengths: I(17), II/IR(22), III(9), IV(12), Klenau (6).

Resulting Attrition: I(4), II/IR(5), III(2), IV(3), Klenau (1).

Total Attrition 28 Apr. - 15 May: I(15), II/IR(15), III(6), IV(6), Klenau (3).

Adjusted to Play: I(12), II/IR(12), III(5), IV(4), Klenau (3):

Total is 36.

Replacements and Ldw.: I(8), II/IR(7), III(26), IV(12), Klenau (5).



cancelled each other out.

The Support Services: The Commissary

Feeding the troops meant supplying 28 oz. of bread, 4 oz. of rice, plus meat and wine to each soldier every day. The quantity of the ration varied. Odier, writing after the wars, gave $\frac{1}{2}$ litre as the wine ration. Rice and bean rations of one ounce were considered a minimum by Napoleon. An order of 14 May 1809 specified sustenance:

Independent of their bread ration of 24 ounces, soldiers will receive:

- at breakfast, soup and $\frac{1}{16}$ pint eau-de-vie.
- at dinner, soup, six ounces of meat, beans and a demi-pot beer or wine.
- at supper, beans and a demi-pot beer or wine.

The ration comprises 24 ounces of bread, 4 ounces soup, 6 ounces meat, 2 ounces rice or 4 ounces beans, $\frac{1}{16}$ pint eau-de-vie, 1 pint beer or 1 bottle of wine, every day.

To provide these vast quantities required billeting on the population or else local purchases at inflated prices, thousands of wagons and river barges, and independent drivers and teams. Each shipment was organized by an agent of transport detailed from Headquarters. Further, forage was seized locally by the troops themselves, receipted for and paid after the war.

Odier says a division of eleven thousand men would theoretically be assigned 51 caissons. If each carried 1.2 tons, there would be 12 lbs. of capacity per man. Exactly $\frac{2}{3}$ are devoted to food, 30 of those to bread. The cost of one month's rations for eleven thousand men is calculated as 81,438 francs. (These are 1809 prices, derived by reducing Odier's figures by 58⁷.) The cost of feeding the French army of 200,000 in 1809 would have been 1,480,700 francs per month.

Odier also estimates that transport of a year's provisions for a corps of 40,600 men would cost 504,000 francs, or 210,000 francs per month for the army of 1809. These figures are of course theoretical, and the French Army could not have transported its full ration requirements even if that had been the intention. Almost everything except bread was gotten locally, and even bread was transported from central bakeries within the theatre.

The Treasury

Napoleon brought 20 million francs into Germany at the start of the 1809 campaign, an amount considered adequate for three months. A further fourteen million francs of the Austrian treasury were captured on the occupation of Vienna, but this sum was probably not even employed for war purposes. Further forced contributions were levied on the Austrians in 1809, which went towards the army's payroll. The pay owed the army for the period May to August alone amounted to 33 million francs.

The June and July wages were the first to be paid not by the French treasury, but entirely from contributions from the occupied territory. For the purpose of collecting these contributions, the "circles" of Korneuburg, Krems, Znaiem, Bruenn, and Pressburg were organized. Funds taken from Vienna were also employed as wages. In the two months prior to July 12th, the French had drawn nearly ten million florins (31 million francs) from the city, and demanded enormous requisitions of supplies. On 15 July, Count Daru was ordered to initiate the collection of these contributions in the amount of 100 million in paper, with which to pay without delay, the army for June, July and August. This order was repeated on 7th September.

An indemnity of 200 million francs had been imposed on the Austrian provinces after mid-July. By 30th September, however, only 50 million francs had been received. The Treaty of Pressburg, signed on the 14th of October, stipulated a balance of 85 million francs, to make a reduced total indemnity of 135 million francs. These cash payments were a primary war aim: to make the war pay for itself. Probably, even after deducting the costs of feeding and billeting the troops, paying their salaries, and purchasing all their equipment, the French made a profit of about 70 million francs on this campaign, though it's doubtful they ever collected the whole amount.

The cost of the campaign over a three month period can be broken down ever further. The cost of provisions for one man could be about 30 francs, or six million total for an army of 200,000. Forage for each horse: 50 francs or 2.5 million for 50,000 horses. Salary for each soldier, around 42 francs, or 8.4 million. Hospital costs, 8.7 francs, 1.7 million total. Transport of provisions: 3.1 francs per man; 630,000 in all. Other costs would total 10.5 francs per man for 2.1 million, and 35.5 francs per horse for 1.7 million. The total cost: 23 million francs.